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II. JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) and the order of the Utah Supreme Court 
dated July 14, 1993, transferring this matter pursuant to Rule 42, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Issues Presented for Review 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that the attorneys7 
fees incurred by Appellee, Industrial Indemnity Company 
("Industrial"), were entitled to a presumption of reasonableness as 
a matter of law, and in finding that each and every fee and cost 
incurred by Industrial was reasonable? 
2. Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in awarding 
Industrial attorneys' fees and costs incurred for redundant and 
duplicative legal representation? 
3. Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in concluding 
that Industrial is entitled to recover from Appellant, Hood 
Corporation ("Hood"), prejudgment interest on attorneys' fees 
awarded where the trial court first had to determine the 
reasonableness of such fees? 
B. Standard of Review 
Issue 1 is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
See Baldwin v. Burton. 850 P.2d 1188, 1199 (Utah 1993); Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); Sprouse v. Jaqer. 
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806 P.2d 219f 226 (Utah App. 1991), except with respect to Hood's 
claims that the trial court (1) improperly afforded Industrial's 
attorneys' fee request a presumption of reasonableness; and (2) 
failed to apply an appropriate standard for attorneys' fee claims 
arising in an indemnitor/indemnitee relationship. Those two claims 
are reviewed under a correction-of-error standard, and are entitled 
to no deference. See. Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 200 (Utah 
1991); CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists. Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969 
(Utah 1989); Hermes Assoc, v. Park's Sportsman. 813 P.2d 1221, 1223 
(Utah App. 1991). 
Issue 2 involves only principles of law. The trial court's 
view of the law is reviewed under a correction-of-error standard, 
and is entitled to no deference. See Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 
198, 200 (Utah 1991); CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists. Inc.. 772 
P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 1989); Hermes Assoc, v. Park's Sportsman. 813 
P.2d 1221, 1223 (Utah App. 1991). 
Issue 3 involves only principles of law. The trial court's 
view of the law is reviewed under a correction-of-error standard, 
and is entitled to no deference. See Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 
198, 200 (Utah 1991); CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists. Inc.. 772 
P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 1989); Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co.. 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah App. 1993); Hermes Assoc, v. Park's 
Sportsman. 813 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Utah App. 1991); Vali Convalescent 
& Care Insts. v. Division of Health Care Fin.. 797 P.2d 438, 444 
(Utah App. 1990). 
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IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
There are no such determinative provisions. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
On or about April 15, 1981, Hood and B.M. Laulhere, President 
of Hood (now deceased) , executed a Contract of Indemnity (General) 
(the "Indemnity Agreement") by which they agreed to indemnify 
Industrial in consideration for Industrial's issuance of certain 
construction bonds for work performed or to be performed by James 
Constructors, Inc. ("James"), which later became a Hood subsidiary. 
Industrial thereafter issued performance and payment bonds in 
the face amount of $1,128,481 in connection with a contract between 
James and Salt Lake City Corporation for a project identified as 
"Big Cottonwood Extension Terminal Park Water Transmission 
Pipeline" (the "Contract"), pursuant to which James was to 
construct an underground water pipeline. 
James performed under the Contract for over one year when Salt 
Lake City Corporation ordered James off the job for a claimed 
breach arising from an alleged failure by James to install the 
pipeline in accordance with Contract terms. On June 28, 1984, Salt 
Lake City Corporation filed suit against James and Industrial to 
recover damages resulting from James7 alleged breach of the 
construction contract (the "Litigation"). James and Hood 
immediately undertook the defense of Industrial's interests in the 
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Litigation and retained various attorneys, along with engineering, 
soils and econometric experts to support their defense. 
James and Hood continued their defense of Industrial's 
interest for over seven years until the parties settled the 
Litigation on November 27, 1991. Industrial did not fund that 
settlement in any way. 
C. Reed Brown, Esq. represented Industrial's interests in the 
Litigation as directed by James and Hood until June 24, 1987, when 
Mr. Brown withdrew as counsel for Industrial and tendered the 
defense to Industrial. Shortly thereafter, James and Hood reached 
an agreement with Mr. Brown to continue his representation of 
Industrial. Mr. Brown then requested Industrial to re-tender its 
defense. James and Hood made additional requests of Industrial to 
re-tender its defense. Industrial refused, however, to re-tender 
the defense at that time. Instead, it filed a Crossclaim/Third 
Party Complaint against Hood and B.M. Laulhere ("Laulhere") to 
determine Hood's indemnification obligations to Industrial. 
Industrial incurred approximately $88,132.09 in attorneys' 
fees between September 21, 1987, the date Industrial filed its own 
Amended Answer, Cross-Claim and Third Party Complaint, and August 
2, 1991, the date Industrial finally re-tendered its defense to 
Hood. In addition, Industrial incurred $21,825.87 for fees prior 
to September 21, 1987. 
On April 4, 1988, after Industrial sued Hood and Laulhere, 
those parties executed a stipulation (the "Stipulation") for the 
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purpose of resolving claims raised by Industrial in its 
Crossclaim/Third Party Complaint. A copy of the Stipulation is 
attached as Exhibit "D" to the Addendum. Industrial agreed to 
minimize thereafter its involvement in the Litigation and not to 
incur unreasonable attorneys' fees in defense of the Litigation. 
By executing the Stipulation, Industrial also agreed to permit 
Hood and James to continue to provide a collective defense for 
Hood, James and Industrial. Industrial further agreed it would look 
only to the net worth of Hood for security. Accordingly, Hood and 
James continued to represent Industrial's interests in the 
Litigation after the execution of the Stipulation. 
Under paragraph 8 of the Stipulation, Hood agreed to pay 
Industrial's "reasonable attorneys fees incurred in this 
action...." As a precondition to Industrial's recovery of 
reasonable attorneys' fees, Hood was authorized to request a 
hearing with respect to the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees 
claimed thereunder. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On August 26, 1992, Industrial filed its Motion for Judgment 
and Award of Attorneys Fees Against Hood Corporation on Indemnity 
Agreement and Stipulation requesting $152,926.34 in attorneys' 
fees, costs and prejudgment interest. In its supporting 
memorandum, Industrial generally argued: (1) As a matter of law, 
it was entitled to a presumption of reasonableness with respect to 
the attorneys' fees it incurred during the course of the 
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Litigation; (2) the attorneys' fees and costs incurred by 
Industrial were reasonable; and (3) Industrial was entitled to 
recover prejudgment interest on all its attorneys7 fees. Hood 
disputed all of Industrial's claims. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
The trial court initially granted Industrial's motion without 
a hearing. Upon entry of the judgment, Hood timely filed its 
Motion for Rehearing and a New Trial, For a Hearing in Accordance 
with Stipulation, and Objection to Form of Judgment Proposed by 
Industrial Indemnity. The trial court then granted a hearing. At 
the March 4, 1993 hearing, the trial court ruled: (1) $5,148.00 in 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Industrial and recorded in 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau's billing statements did not relate 
to the Litigation and were not recoverable from Hood; (2) 
Industrial was entitled to recover from Hood $115,177.61 in 
attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Stipulation and Indemnity 
Agreement; and (3) Industrial was entitled to recover from Hood 
prejudgment interest in the amount of $56,139.23 on those 
attorneys' fees and costs. A copy of the trial court's March 4, 
1993 ruling is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Addendum. A copy of 
the judgment executed by the trial court is attached as Exhibit MAM 
to the Addendum. 
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VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Attorneys' fees incurred by an indemnitee pursuant to an 
indemnity agreement are not entitled to a presumption of 
reasonableness. The trial court erred in failing to analyze 
Industrial's attorneys' fee request pursuant to factors tailored to 
the indemnitor/indemnitee relationship. The trial court failed to 
make findings required by applicable case law. The trial court 
abused its discretion in finding Industrial was "insecure", and in 
concluding that every penny of attorneys' fees and costs incurred 
by Industrial were reasonable. 
B. The trial court erred as a matter of law in allowing 
duplicative and redundant attorneys' fees incurred by Industrial. 
Industrial's defense was undertaken by attorneys for James and 
Hood, and to the extent Industrial incurred attorneys' fees for 
duplicative, unnecessary and undifferentiated legal representation, 
the trial court should have disallowed those fees. 
C. The trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest on the 
attorneys' fees incurred by Industrial. Prejudgment interest 
should not be awarded on attorneys' fees and costs where the trier 
of fact must determine their reasonableness. The factfinder uses 
its best judgment in assessing and ascertaining reasonable 
attorneys' fees, and until it exercises that judgment, an 
attorneys' fee award is unliquidated. A determination of 
reasonable attorneys' fees is subject to an abuse-of-discretion 
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standard of review. The nature of such a discretionary 
determination precludes the award of prejudgment interest. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
This appeal involves (1) the standards to be used by a trial 
court in ascertaining reasonable attorneys' fees; and (2) the 
entitlement to prejudgment interest on such reasonable fees. A 
review of the trial court's interpretation of the parties' 
Stipulation, and its conclusions of law and application of the law 
to the facts found, demonstrates the trial court: (1) failed to 
apply the appropriate standard for awarding reasonable attorneys' 
fees under an indemnity agreement, (2) abused its discretion in 
awarding all attorneys' fees incurred by Industrial; (3) improperly 
awarded attorneys' fees and costs Industrial incurred for 
duplicative, redundant and undifferentiated legal work; and (4) 
erred in awarding prejudgment interest to Industrial. 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Finding Industrial's Attorneys' Fees 
Were Reasonable. 
1. The Attorneys' Fees and Costs Incurred by Industrial Are 
Not Entitled to a Presumption of Reasonableness. 
In its pleadings requesting its attorneys' fees and 
costs, Industrial repeatedly—and wrongly—argued its attorneys' 
fees request was entitled to a presumption of reasonableness which 
requires the indemnitor (Hood) to prove the indemnitee's 
(Industrial) requested attorneys' fees were unreasonable. See R. 
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3166, 3397-98, 3441. According to Industrial's argument, Hood had 
the burden of persuasion. 
The trial court apparently agreed with Industrial's 
argument. During closing arguments, the trial court addressed 
counsel for Industrial: 
So if it rattorneys' fees! begins out as all 
being reasonable then the prong that I think 
that Mr. Anderson is claiming the right to 
prevail on is that it, in fact, wasn't 
necessary. (emphasis added). 
(R. 3782, Add. 71). 
Utah law, however, is contrary to Industrial's argument 
and the trial court's apparent decision to accord Industrial's 
attorneys' fees request a presumption of reasonableness. A party 
requesting reasonable attorneys' fees has the burden of proving 
both their reasonableness and necessity. See Rothev v. Walker Bank 
& Trust Co.. 754 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Utah 1988). 
In Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc.. 786 P.2d 1350, 
1361 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990), the 
trial court denied indemnitees' request for attorneys' fees because 
the indemnitees failed to carry their burden of establishing that 
their claimed fees were reasonable and necessary. This court 
rejected the indemnitees' argument that evidence of reasonableness 
and necessity is not required to recover attorneys' fees under an 
indemnity agreement: 
" [i]t is well established that to justify a 
finding of a reasonable attorney's fee, there 
must be evidence in support of that finding . 
9 
. . It is beyond dispute that an evidentiary 
basis is a fundamental requirement for 
establishing an award of attorney fees. 
Other jurisdictions similarly require an indemnitee such 
as Industrial to establish that its attorneys' fees are reasonable 
and necessary when seeking to recover such fees under an indemnity 
agreement. In Wilson-Jump Company v. McCarthv-Hundrieser and 
Assoc. . Inc. . 85 Ill.App. 3d 179, 192, 405 N.E.2d 1322, 1325 (App. 
1980) , 40 111. Dec. 230, the court held that an indemnitee under an 
indemnity agreement, "is still required to establish what were 
reasonable attorneys' fees and the indemnitor is not necessarily 
liable for the amount the indemnitee unilaterally agreed to pay or 
did pay its lawyer." (emphasis added). See also, Perkins v. 
Thompson. 551 So.2d 204, 209 (Miss. 1989)("[a surety] cannot 
needlessly, in utter disregard of the burdens he is imposing on his 
indemnitor, incur attorneys' fees, and in no case such as are 
excessive and unreasonable in amount.") 
An indemnitee such as Industrial is required to prove the 
reasonableness of its attorneys' fee request to prevent the 
financial abuse of the indemnitor under an indemnity agreement. 
See Jackson v. Hollowell. 685 F.2d 961, 966 (5th Cir. 1982). The 
trial court erred, as a matter of law, in determining that 
Industrial's attorneys' fees request was entitled to a presumption 
of reasonableness. 
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2. Industrial Must Establish That Its Attorneys' Fees Were 
Reasonable. Necessary, and Incurred In Good Faith, 
An indemnity agreement does not confer on an indemnitee 
an absolute right to incur and be reimbursed whatever attorneys' 
fees and costs it sees fit to incur. See Hollowell, 685 F.2d at p. 
965. Numerous appellate courts accordingly have recognized the 
need to protect the indemnitor from unreasonable and needless 
attorneys' fees incurred by the indemnitee in disregard of the 
financial burdens imposed thereby on the indemnitor. 
As a result of this concern, courts require an indemnitee 
who requests reimbursement of attorneys' fees under an indemnity 
agreement to establish that the attorneys' fees are reasonable, 
necessary, and incurred in good faith toward the indemnitor. See, 
e.g.
 P Perkins v. Thompson, 551 So.2d at p. 210 ("the surety is 
entitled to reimbursement for legal costs only if it is necessary 
for the surety to retain separate counsel, if the amount of the 
fees claimed is reasonable, and if the surety has acted in good 
faith toward the principal."); Love v. United States Fidelity and 
Guaranty Co. . 263 Ark. 925, 568 S.W.2d 746 (1978) ("'to be 
recoverable by the indemnitee, the attorneys' fees must be 
reasonable, proper, necessary and incurred in good faith and with 
due diligence. . . . ' " ) ; Central Towers Apartments, Inc. v. Martin, 
61 Tenn.App. 244, 267, 453 S.W.2d 789, 799 (Tenn. App. 1969)("we 
hold that when the principal and his indemnified surety are sued by 
the obligee under the surety's bond, and the surety exercises its 
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right under the indemnity agreement of the principal to hire its 
own separate counsel and incur litigation expense in defense of the 
action, the liability of the principal for the attorney fees and 
expenses thus incurred by the surety depends upon whether, under 
all the facts of the cases, it was reasonably necessary for the 
surety to so act in its own defense, and whether the surety acted 
in good faith toward the principal•") 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
explained the rationale for requiring the indemnitee to demonstrate 
reasonableness, necessity and good faith: 
[A]n indemnity agreement is not a blank check; 
it does not entitle the surety company to 
reimbursement for legal expenses which are 
unreasonable or unnecessary. To hold 
otherwise would allow bonding companies to 
retain counsel and to charge attorneys7 fees 
against the indemnitor even when the surety 
company does not require a separate legal 
defense to protect its interests. 
Hollowell. 685 F.2d at 966. 
Accordingly, Industrial was required, as a matter of law, 
to establish the reasonableness and necessity of its attorneys' 
fees request, and to establish that it incurred its attorneys' fees 
and costs in good faith. 
3. The Trial Court Erred As A Matter of Law In Failing to 
Analyze Industrial's Attorneys' Fee Request According to Standards 
Tailored to The Indemnitor/Indemnitee Relationship. 
As demonstrated in the two immediately preceding 
subpoints, a court must scrutinize the evidence to determine 
whether the indemnitee acted in good faith in incurring attorneys' 
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fees, and whether such fees are reasonable and necessary. 
Hollowell. 685 F.2d at 966; Central Towers.. 453 S.W.2d at 799. 
In Rincfwood. this court established that an applicant for 
attorneys' fees and costs must prove the fees and costs sought were 
both reasonable and necessary. No Utah appellate court has ever 
enumerated, however, specific factors for a trial court to consider 
in determining whether an indemnitee has satisfied its burden of 
justifying the necessity, reasonableness and good faith of the 
attorneys7 fees and costs it seeks to recover from an indemnitor. 
Attorneys7 fees and costs in an indemnity context are 
wholly different in character from the typical attorneys7 fees 
request. Ordinarily, the party requesting attorneys7 fees is 
adverse to the party from whom the fees are requested. In such an 
ordinary context, one party is reacting to what the other party has 
done, or is forcing the other party to respond to it. 
In an indemnity situation, however, the parties are 
realigned. Rather than responding and reacting to what each other 
has done, they are on the same side. Because of this identity of 
interest in an indemnity context, there is always a potential that 
one party to the indemnity relationship will gratuitously and 
unnecessarily duplicate the work of the other. 
In the present case at least two and sometimes three sets 
of attorneys represented James and Hood. Industrial admitted at 
the hearing, and the trial court found, that Hood and James were 
vigorously defending the claims against themselves and Industrial. 
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(R. 3676, 3723-25; Finding No, 14, R. 3469, Add. 13). Despite the 
fact that two and sometimes three law firms were vigorously 
defending the action, Industrial chose to employ yet another set of 
attorneys to defend the same claims. 
In recognition of the ever-present possibility of 
unnecessary duplicative and redundant work, courts impose 
heightened evidentiary burdens on indemnitees such as Industrial 
who seek reimbursement of attorneys7 fees and costs from 
indemnitors such as Hood. See Perkins v. Thompson, 551 So.2d at 
210; Central Towers. 453 S.W.2d at 800. 
Trial courts accordingly should consider the following 
factors in determining whether attorneys' fees incurred by an 
indemnitee, such as Industrial, were reasonable, necessary, and 
incurred in good faith: 
[1] [T]he amount of risk to which the surety 
was exposed; [2] whether the principal was 
solvent; [3] whether the surety has called on 
the principal to deposit with it funds to 
cover the potential liability; [4] whether the 
principal on demand by the surety to deposit 
with it the amount of the claim has refused to 
do so; [5] whether the principal was notified 
of the action and given opportunity to defend 
for itself and the surety; [6] whether the 
principal hired the attorney for both himself 
and the surety; [7] whether the principal 
notified the surety of the hiring of the 
attorney; [8] the competency of the attorney 
hired by the principal; [9] the diligence 
displayed by the principal and his attorney in 
the defense; [10] whether there is a conflict 
of interest between the parties; [11] the 
attitude and cooperativeness of the surety; 
[12] and the amount charged and diligence of 
the attorney hired by the surety. 
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Perkins v. Thompson, 551 So.2d at p. 210. See also, cases cited 
therein. 
In subpoint VILA.5, infra. Hood marshals the evidence in 
support of the trial courts findings that Hood disputes on 
appeal,1 and demonstrates why, notwithstanding the evidence in 
support of those findings, the trial court abused its discretion. 
The trial court failed, however, to make findings of fact 
on factor nos. 8 (the competency of the attorney hired by the 
principal); 10 (whether there was a conflict of interest between 
the parties); 11 (the attitude and cooperativeness of Industrial) ; 
and 12 (the diligence (but not the hourly rates) of the attorneys 
for Industrial). 
These omitted factors were critical to the analysis 
employed by the Central Towers court. In Central Towers, the court 
held that the surety did not act in good faith and under a 
reasonable necessity in hiring separate attorneys so as to justify 
the recovery of attorneys7 fees from the principal due to the 
*The marshalling performed in subpoint VILA. 5 demonstrates the 
following evidence with respect to the foregoing Perkins factors: 
(1) the surety believed it was exposed to risk until April 1988, 
when Hood executed the Stipulation; (2) it was undisputed that Hood 
was solvent; (3) in the Stipulation, Industrial agreed it would 
accept Hood's net worth in lieu of any other security; (4) by 
executing the Stipulation Hood complied with Industrial's request 
for security; (5) Hood was aware of the action and did vigorously 
defend both itself and Industrial; (6) Hood hired an attorney for 
both itself and James and for Industrial; (7) Hood notified 
Industrial of Hood's hiring of the attorney; . . . (9) the 
attorneys for Hood and James "vigorously defended" their interests; 
. . . (12) the hourly rates charged by counsel for Industrial were 
reasonable. 
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absence of a conflict of interest (factor no. 10), the competency 
of the principal's attorneys (factor no. 8) , the solvency of the 
principal (factor no. 2) and the diligence of the principal's 
attorneys in defending the suit (factor no. 9) . See Central 
Towers. 453 S.W.2d at p. 800. 
The trial court failed to make findings of fact with 
respect to all factors appropriate to the award of attorneys' fees 
and costs in an indemnity context. It failed to identify the 
weight, if any, it accorded each factor. This court accordingly 
should remand to the trial court with instructions that it should 
enter specific and detailed findings with respect to each of the 
foregoing twelve factors, and to state on the record its 
methodology in weighing each factor. 
4. The Trial Court Also Failed To Make Findings On All 
Elements Previously Required Under Existing Utah Law. 
If this court declines to adopt the analysis set forth 
under subpoint 3, immediately above, it should rule that the trial 
court nevertheless erred in its failure to make findings on all 
factors required under existing Utah law. Under Utah law, a trial 
court must consider the following factors, at a minimum, to 
determine the reasonableness of a request for attorneys' fees: 
(1) The difficulty of the case; 
(2) The efficiency of attorneys for whom the 
fees are requested; 
(3) The reasonableness of the number of hours 
billed by the attorneys; 
(4) The amount of attorneys' fees requested; 
(5) The total amount of all claims at issue 
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in the litigation; 
(6) The results obtained by the attorneys 
requesting reimbursement of fees; and 
(7) The expertise and experience of the 
attorneys. 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985). 
Although the trial court made findings with respect to 
factors 1,3,4,5 and 7, which are analyzed in the immediately 
following subpart, it made no findings regarding factors 2 (the 
efficiency of the attorneys) , and 6 (the result obtained by the 
attorneys). Thus, the trial court's findings are deficient under 
Utah law. 
5. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Finding the 
Attorneys' Fees Incurred by Industrial Were Reasonable. Necessary 
and Incurred In Good Faith. 
A trial court's calculation of reasonable attorneys' fees 
is subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. See, 
e.g. , Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1199 (Utah 1993); Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); Sprouse v. 
Jager, 806 P.2d 219, 226 (Utah App. 1991). 
In order to mount a successful appeal of a trial court's 
findings of fact: 
[A]n appellant must marshal all the evidence 
in support of the trial court's findings and 
then demonstrate that even viewing it in the 
light most favorable to the court below, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings. 
Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). The 
trial court abused its discretion in finding Industrial's 
17 
attorneys' fees to be reasonable, necessary and incurred in good 
faith. The evidence presented to the trial court was insufficient 
to support finding of fact numbers 14, 25, and 292. 
a. Finding of Pact No. 14. In finding no. 14, the 
trial court concluded that "Industrial Indemnity was justifiably 
concerned as to whether Hood would adequately protect the interests 
of Industrial. . . [I]t was not unreasonable for Industrial to 
determine that it was necessary to defend itself in the litigation 
to protect and preserve its interests." (R. 3469, Add. 13). 
The trial court based this conclusion on the 
following subsidiary findings. All evidence supporting each 
subsidiary finding appears in the record as indicated after each 
subsidiary finding: "James, the bond principal, was without 
assets" (R. 3580-81, Add. 16-17); "Hood had paid very little 
attention to the Salt Lake City litigation even though its exposure 
approached three million dollars" (R. 3583-85, 3595, Add. 31-33, 
37) ; "Hood did not list this very significant and dangerous 
litigation in its financial statement" (R. 3601-02, 3613-14, 3621-
23, Add. 43-49); "Hood had been reluctant to pay Mr. Brown's 
attorneys' fees, even though Mr. Brown had vigorously defended 
James and had also accepted tender of the Industrial defense" (R. 
3586-88, 3598, Add. 34-36, 40); "the defense of Industrial 
2Finding 29 states only a legal conclusion, even though it is 
captioned as a finding (R. 3474, Add. 18). Consequently Hood will 
not marshal any evidence in support of that conclusion. It 
necessarily fails with finding nos. 14 and 25. 
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Indemnity had been tendered back to Industrial" (R. 3596-98, Add. 
38-40); "Hood's stubborn refusal to post collateral or to provide 
other adequate and acceptable security to Industrial" (R. 3599-
3602, Add. 41-44); "and Hood's refusal to authorize or participate 
in settlement negotiations with Salt Lake City Corporation, even 
though massive failures had occurred in the pipeline project and 
the City had removed and relayed virtually the entire pipeline." 
(R. 3583-85, 3691-94, 3698, Add. 31-33, 53-57). 
All the foregoing evidence is legally insufficient 
to support the trial court's finding when viewing finding no. 14 in 
the light most favorable to the trial court. In Central Towers, 
the court reversed a lower court award of attorneys' fees to the 
surety pursuant to an indemnity agreement. The reversal was based 
on the absence of risk to the surety as a practical matter, the 
solvency of the indemnitor, the competency of the indemnitor's 
attorneys who were engaged to represent the surety's interest, the 
active defense of the suit by the indemnitor's attorneys and the 
lack of a conflict of interest between the indemnitor and the 
surety. See Central Towers, 453 S.W.2d at 800. 
The same factors that led to the Central Towers 
reversal are present in this appeal. Because of Hood's strong 
financial condition, Industrial was exposed to no risk in the 
Litigation. Indeed, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Hood 
maintained at least a 20 million dollar net worth throughout the 
Litigation, which amount was made known to Industrial and was 
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clearly sufficient to satisfy any judgment on Industrial's 1.128 
million dollar bond. (Ex. D-15, Add. 75)3. The trial court did 
not find Hood unable to pay a judgment that might ultimately be 
entered in the Litigation. In fact, Hood settled the Litigation 
with its own funds. Industrial paid nothing toward the settlement. 
Industrial presented no evidence demonstrating that Hood was unable 
throughout the course of the Litigation to satisfy any judgment 
against Industrial. 
The trial court found that James' lack of assets 
justified Industrial's separate defense in the Litigation. The 
trial court abused its discretion in relying on this factor because 
it overlooks Hood's guarantor status under the Stipulation. Hood 
was financially responsible to indemnify Industrial from any 
judgment on Industrial's bond. Hood did not lack sufficient assets 
to respond. Accordingly, James' financial status became irrelevant 
once Hood executed the Stipulation. 
The trial court made no finding of fact concerning 
the competency of the attorneys hired by James and Hood to defend 
3The trial court's expressed reliance on Hood's failure to 
mention the Litigation in its financial statements is also an abuse 
of discretion. There was no expert testimony one way or the other 
whether the Litigation was material to those audited financial 
statements, or whether Hood's auditors should have, under generally 
accepted accounting principles, mentioned the Litigation. Without 
expert testimony, a trial court cannot speculate on what should be 
included in the footnotes to an audited financial statement 
prepared by a big-eight accounting firm. The issue is legally 
irrelevant in any event because the trial court refused to find 
Hood's financial strength insufficient to satisfy Industrial's 
liability under the bond. 
20 
Industrial's interests in the Litigation. It did, however, find 
that the attorneys for Hood and James vigorously defended 
Industrial's interests in the Litigation. (Finding No. 14, R. 
3469, Add. 13). Only during the approximate three-month period in 
1987 between Brown's tender of Industrial's defense and Brown's 
request for re-tender, were Industrial's interests not fully and 
vigorously represented by counsel for James and Hood. 
The court made no findings concerning whether a 
conflict of interest existed between Industrial and Hood. Because 
Hood was a guarantor under the indemnity agreement, it was 
responsible to indemnify Industrial up to the full face amount of 
Industrial's bond. Hood's success in the litigation was 
inextricably intertwined with Industrial. Industrial avoided 
liability in the litigation and Hood had no indemnity obligation. 
If, however, Industrial had been found liable to SLCC, then Hood 
was obligated to indemnify Industrial. There was no conflict of 
interest between Hood and Industrial. 
The trial court also abused its discretion in 
finding that Hood paid very little attention to the Salt Lake City 
litigation. Hood, James, and liability insurers expended 
approximately $626,000 in attorneys' fees and experts' fees in 
defense of the Litigation. (R. 3294). This was not the act of a 
disinterested party. 
The trial court further abused its discretion when 
it found that Hood's refusal to post collateral justified and made 
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necessary Industrial's separate defense. Industrial was well aware 
of Hood's financial strength when it unnecessarily requested the 
posting of collateral from Hood in 1987. After Industrial's 
request to post collateral, however, the parties entered into the 
April 19, 1988 Stipulation (R. 902-09; Add. 20-27) which expressly 
relieved Hood of any responsibility to post collateral. (R. 906-
07, J 11# Add. 24-25). 
Notwithstanding the express language of f 11 of the 
Stipulation, the trial court announced in its oral ruling: "I do 
believe that Industrial Indemnity had significant reasons to be 
insecure, that the financial statements of Hood, in terms of their 
net worth being plus or minus $20,000,000, while impressive, were 
not sufficiently secure under the theory of the indemnity agreement 
to give the indemnitor [sic], Industrial Indemnity Company, 
sufficient security to feel that they could leave the case." (R. 
3560, Add. 5). 
The trial court accordingly approved every penny of 
Industrial's attorneys' fees based on the court's perception of 
Hood's financial strength. Indeed, the foregoing language is the 
only oral finding the trial court made on the record regarding the 
factual basis of its conclusion that the attorneys' fees requested 
by Industrial were necessarily incurred. As the sole finding made 
independently by the trial court (the written findings were 
prepared by Industrial's counsel) this single oral finding should 
be subject to special scrutiny. 
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In making its overriding, single oral finding, the 
trial court overlooked that Industrial specifically accepted Hood's 
financial condition as adequate in connection with its execution of 
the Stipulation: 
11. As consideration for Hood and 
Laulhere's Stipulation hereunder, Industrial 
agrees not to require the posting of 
collateral or other security under the 
Indemnity Agreement, unless the net worth of 
Hood Corporation deteriorates more than twenty 
percent (20%) from its 1987 tax year end 
audited financial statement. Hood and 
Laulhere shall submit financial statements and 
other proof of financial condition at any time 
at the request of Industrial. 
(R. 906-07, Add. 24-25)(emphasis added). Indeed, Industrial 
admitted at the hearing on its attorneys' fees request that the 
point of the Stipulation "was to resolve the collateral issue." 
(R. 3666, Add. 50). 
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion 
when it found Industrial's post-Stipulation attorneys' fees were 
reasonable because Industrial was "not sufficiently secure." (R. 
3560, Add. 5) . Industrial made the conscious choice in April, 
1988, to rely on Hood's financial strength rather than requiring 
Hood to post a cash bond. The trial court's oral finding of 
reasonableness of Industrial's attorneys' fees was predicated 
solely on the trial court's perception of Industrial's 
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"insecurity".4 The trial court, however, ignored the fact that 
Industrial consciously and willingly accepted Hood's guaranty as 
Industrial's sole security. The trial court similarly ignored the 
29% growth in Hood's net worth between 1988 and 1991 (Ex. D-15, 
Add. 75) . 
The trial court therefore made a new contract for 
Industrial. In doing so, the trial court abused its discretion in 
concluding that Industrial had grounds for feeling "insecure," and 
that the insecurity justified Industrial's post-Stipulation5 
attorneys' fees and costs. 
4When Industrial accepted Hood's guaranty, Hood had a 1987 net 
worth of $23,944,000. In ensuing years, Hood's net worth grew as 
follows: 
1988 $22,097,000 
1989 25,196,000 
1990 27,867,000 
1991 28,406,000 
(Ex. D-15, Add. 75). Not only was the trial court's ruling an 
abuse of discretion because it rewrote the Stipulation; it also 
constituted an abuse of discretion and was flat wrong to the extent 
it found Hood's financial condition deteriorated after 1988. 
5This particular portion of Hood's argument does not challenge 
the trial court's award of pre-Stipulation attorneys' fees, 
although Hood challenges those fees elsewhere. It is notable 
however, that Industrial incurred $64,262.50 in attorneys' fees 
after the date of the Stipulation. See Ex. P-2. Despite 
Industrial's admission that Hood's net worth constituted adequate 
collateral, and despite the trial court's finding that Hood's 
counsel "vigorously defended" Industrial, the trial court did not 
deduct one penny from Industrial's requested fees and costs, except 
for $5,148.00 that Industrial conceded was not spent in defending 
the Litigation. 
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b. Finding of Fact No. 25. The trial court found the 
attorneys' fees expended by Industrial, as set forth in the 
statements of its counsel, were both reasonable and necessary based 
on the following factors and evidence: (1) the complexity of the 
matter (R. 3583-88, 3691, Add. 31-36, 53); (2) the reasonableness 
of the decision of Industrial to defend itself (R. 3580-81, 3583-
85, 3595-96, 3601-02, 3613-14, 3622, 3677-78, 3691-94, 3698, 3752-
54, Add. 29-33. 37-38, 43-46, 48, 51-57, 68-70); (3) the 
reasonableness of the investigation which needed to be done (R. 
3584-85, Add. 32-33); (4) the reasonableness of the decision and 
agreement to assert Industrial's independent defenses (R. 3709-18, 
Add. 58-67); and (5) the dispute regarding the amount of attorneys7 
fees. See Finding No. 25, R. 3473, Add. 17). The foregoing 
evidence relied upon by the trial court again is insufficient to 
support its finding that the attorneys7 fees expended by Industrial 
were reasonable and necessary. 
With respect to the first factor, Hood does not 
challenge the trial court's finding that the Litigation was 
complex. Mere complexity of litigation, however, does not 
necessarily require separate representation if an indemnitor7s 
counsel is competent and diligent. The trial court made no finding 
that counsel representing James and Hood were incompetent or lax. 
To the contrary, the trial court found their counsel had 
"vigorously defended" the action. The trial court's finding 
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regarding the complexity of the litigation is legally irrelevant to 
its grant to Industrial of its attorneys' fees. 
Hood has already discussed the reasonableness of 
Industrial's decision to defend itself in the immediately preceding 
subpoint of its argument. The Stipulation unequivocally states 
that after April 19, 1988 Industrial agreed to look only to Hood's 
net worth for security. Accordingly, Industrial simply had no 
cause for insecurity after April, 1988. 
The third and fourth factors, having to do with 
Industrial's investigation and its decision to assert independent 
defenses, both occurred long before the Stipulation. The 
investigatory stage took place immediately after attorneys for 
Industrial received their file in this matter, and long before 
April 1988. (R. 3583-85, Add. 31-33). Similarly, Industrial filed 
its pleading asserting its independent defenses on September 27, 
1987. The trial court dismissed those independent defenses on May 
17, 1988 (R. 968-70). Consequently, Industrial's investigation, 
and its action on its independent defenses, were both concluded by 
1988. Accordingly, these factors were irrelevant to the trial 
court's award of post-Stipulation attorneys' fees. 
Finally, the dispute regarding the amount of 
Industrial's claimed attorneys' fees did not arise until Industrial 
filed its August 6, 1992 Motion for Judgment and Award of Attorneys 
Fees Against Hood Corporation on Indemnity Agreement and 
Stipulation. The trial court, however, awarded Industrial all of 
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its attorneys' fees during the intervening four-and-one-half year 
period during which Industrial was doing nothing on its own behalf. 
Its independent defenses had been dismissed. During this time 
Industrial had no interest to protect because it stipulated in 
April, 1988, that Hood's guaranty of indemnity constituted 
sufficient collateral. For all these reasons, the trial court 
abused its discretion when it awarded Hood all attorneys' fees it 
incurred after April, 1988. 
The trial court also awarded Industrial its 
attorneys' fees incurred in answering and asserting its defenses. 
Industrial claims to have asserted defenses that were independent 
of defenses available to Hood or James. While Industrial had 
potential independent defenses, Industrial's defense effort 
demonstrably included duplication of the arguments asserted by 
James and Hood in defense of the litigation. As demonstrated in 
Point VII.B.1., infra. these duplicative arguments were 
unreasonable and unnecessary. 
As relevant to this portion of Hood's appeal, 
however, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial court should 
also consider the results obtained by the attorneys who seek 
reimbursement for attorneys' fees. See Cabrera, 694 P. 2d at p. 
625. The trial court twice dismissed each of Industrial's 
independent defenses. (R. 968-70, 1458-59). The dismissal of 
Industrial's independent claims should, under Cabrera. result in 
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careful scrutiny to determine whether any of those fees and costs 
are properly chargeable to Hood. 
6. The Trial Courts Failure to Exercise its Discretion 
Constitutes an Abuse of its Discretion. 
The trial court abrogated its duty to analyze the 
necessity of work performed by Industrial's counsel when it ruled: 
,fI specifically cannot find that after the fact that it would be 
appropriate to assume that there was a certain factor of 
unnecessary work that was done." (R. 3560, Add. 5). This totally 
deferential review by the trial court was erroneous as a matter of 
law. A trial court's duty is to analyze — of necessity "after the 
fact" — the necessity of an indemnitee's legal expenses. As held 
by the Fifth Circuit, "an indemnity agreement is not a blank 
check." Hollowell, 685 F.2d at p. 966. 
The trial court did not even properly define its duty 
when it refused to "assume" counsel for Industrial performed 
unnecessary work. That is not the standard. Hood did not have to 
prove Industrial's requested fees and costs were unreasonable. 
Rather, Industrial was required to prove to the Court by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the legal activity it undertook 
was reasonable, necessary, in good faith, non-duplicative and not 
redundant. By failing to analyze Industrial's request in that 
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manner, the trial court abrogated its legal duty to scrutinize the 
reasonableness and necessity of that work.6 
Before ruling, the trial court announced its 
unwillingness to address the necessity of the attorneys' fees 
Industrial requested: ffI either take [$]51,000.00 or I take 
[$]122,000.00 if I buy the argument that they [Industrial] aren't 
entitled to any interest and I minus from that $5,000.00 plus or 
minus for the errors in it, or I take $171,000.00. Now every one 
of them strikes me as being somewhat arbitrary. Any one of the 
three." (R. 3800, Add. 74)(emphasis added). The trial court 
admitted the basis of its attorneys' fee award was "somewhat 
arbitrary", yet it did not subject Industrial's fee request to 
independent scrutiny. In other words, the trial court declined to 
use its discretion when it apparently chose a number that seemed 
less arbitrary than other numbers. 
Courts uniformly hold that if a trial court fails to 
exercise its discretion when required to do so, it has abdicated 
6The trial court disallowed only $5,148.00 in Industrial's 
requested fees and costs. Even that deduction did not result from 
the trial court's exercise of independent judgment and analysis. 
Rather, that deduction resulted from a concession by Industrial's 
counsel that those fees of approximately $5,000 and an airplane 
ticket for $148.00 were erroneously billed to the construction 
project at issue in this Litigation (R. 3572-87, 3787). In other 
words, the trial court did not disallow a penny of Industrial's 
fees and costs incurred in the Litigation. 
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and abused its discretion.7 The record reflects the trial court in 
this case filed to exercise its discretion in reviewing 
Industrial's request for reasonable attorneys' fees. This court 
accordingly should reverse the trial court. 
B. The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law in Concluding 
Industrial Should be Awarded Attorneys' Fees for Redundant and 
Duplicative Legal Work. 
Part VILA., supra. demonstrates why the trial court (1) erred 
as a matter of law in failing to employ factors specifically 
tailored to the indemnitor/indemnitee relationship; and (2) abused 
its discretion in awarding Industrial all of its claimed attorneys' 
fees.8 
Separate and distinct from those errors, the trial court erred 
as a matter of law in approving redundant and duplicative work 
performed by counsel for Industrial. This portion of Hood's appeal 
does not challenge or involve the trial court's findings. Rather, 
7See, e.g. , Gonzalez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
996 F.2d 804, 811 (6th Cir. 1993); Johnson v. State, 325 Md. 511, 
601 A.2d 1093, 1097 (App. 1992); Milwaukee Journal v. Board of 
Regents of the University of Wisconsin. 163 Wise.2d 933, 472 N.W.2d 
607, 612 (App. 1991); Moody v. Larsen, 802 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Colo. 
App. 1990); People v. Stafford, 434 Mich. 125, 450 N.W.2d 559, 563 
n.4 (1990); Richelson v. Richelson. 130 N.H. 137, 536 A.2d 176, 179 
(1987); In re the marriage of Hatch, 169 Cal. App. 3d 1213, 1222, 
215 Cal. Rptr. 789, 794 (App. 1985); State v. Willis, 145 Vt. 459, 
494 A.2d 108, 112 (1985). 
8Hood never urged the trial court to deny Industrial all its 
fees and costs. Hood argued only that much of Industrial's work 
was unnecessary or duplicative, and therefore unallowable. See pp. 
28-29, supra. 
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it challenges the trial court's legal conclusion that redundant and 
duplicative legal services can be reasonable and necessary. 
Hood argued to the trial court that Industrial should not be 
compensated for (1) raising and re-litigating legal defenses and 
arguments that needlessly duplicated pleadings already filed by 
Hood's attorneys; (2) attending depositions where Industrial 
Indemnity's counsel did not participate in any way; and (3) 
constant and useless generalized monitoring by its attorneys of the 
legal work being performed by Hood's attorneys which they billed 
only in undifferentiated lump sums. 
An indemnitee cannot recover legal fees expended on activities 
that needlessly duplicate services rendered by the principal's 
counsel. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hollowell. 685 F.2d 961/ 966 (5th 
Cir. 1982). ("The indemnity contract cannot reasonably be construed 
as requiring the indemnitee to bear the cost of such redundant 
representation."); Sentry Ins. Co. v. Davison Fuel & Dock Co., 60 
Ohio App.2d 248, 396 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (App. 1978). 
In Sentry, a surety sought indemnification for all attorneys' 
fees incurred in defense of a claim under a surety bond, including 
fees for separate attorney services that duplicated those provided 
by the principal's counsel. The Ohio Court of Appeals held that 
the surety could not recover duplicative attorneys fees: 
We reject all claims for recovery of fees and 
expenses paid for duplication of services, 
that is, for services which were 
simultaneously being rendered competently by 
principal's counsel in preparing for and 
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participating in the trial on the merits of 
the . . . claim against the principal. . . 
Id. at p.1074. As a consequence of its holding, the court limited 
the surety's recovery to attorneys' fees directly related to those 
defenses separate and apart from the principal's defenses. Id. 
As in Sentry, Industrial incurred substantial attorneys' fees 
for duplicative services which were simultaneously and competently 
rendered by counsel for Hood and James. 
1, Industrial Has Charged Hood for Redundant and Duplicative 
Pleadings. 
Rather than re-tendering its defense to Hood's and James' 
attorneys in August 1987 as they requested, on September 23, 1987 
Industrial filed its Amended Answer to Salt Lake City Corporation's 
Complaint. (R 410-18) Industrial's Answer merely reasserted the 
affirmative defenses raised by counsel for James, with the 
exception of affirmative defenses concerning improper disbursements 
of contract payments to James. Compare, Hood's June 2, 1986 Answer 
(R. 180-90), with Industrial's September 21, 1987 Amended Answer 
(R. 410-18). 
In connection with its redundant and duplicative Answer, 
Industrial unnecessarily and unreasonably expended thousands of 
dollars in attorneys' fees by: (1) asserting the same legal 
defenses and theories that Hood and James had vigorously asserted 
since 1984; (2) unsuccessfully attempting to preserve its separate 
affirmative defenses; and (3) filing unnecessary memoranda in 
support of actions taken by James. Only after Industrial had 
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incurred thousands of dollars in unnecessary, duplicative, and 
unreasonable legal expenses did Industrial re-tender its defense to 
Hood on August 2, 1991. (Ex. P-20, Add. 76-77). 
Industrial incurred approximately $88,132.09 in 
attorneys' fees between the date of its Answer and its re-tender of 
its defense. Where a principal/indemnitor such as Hood is 
vigorously defending the primary claim asserted by the plaintiff, 
it is unreasonable and duplicative for the surety to expend 
$88,132.09 to re-litigate the factual issues and defense theories 
already being asserted. In such cases, the surety should limit its 
activities to non-duplicative defenses. Industrial should not 
recover attorneys' fees for the unnecessary and duplicative legal 
services it voluntarily and gratuitously incurred. 
In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Wood, 296 Ky. 476, 177 S.W.2d 
3 65 (App. 1943), a surety sought reimbursement for all costs it 
incurred defending a suit against itself and its principal. The 
principal resisted, arguing the surety did not act in good faith 
because it sought to recover for duplicative and redundant work. 
In reversing the trial court's award of attorneys' fees sought by 
the surety, the Wood court held: "[I]f there was no reasonable 
necessity for the surety to incur such expense, good faith toward 
his principal would require that he should not burden the former 
with an unnecessary obligation.11 Id. at 367. 
Addressing the surety's separate answer which duplicated 
the principal's defenses, the Wood court wrote: 
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It was also uncontradictedly shown that local 
employed counsel by defendant put forth every 
available defense in the action against their 
client, as well as in defense of his surety. 
Defendant and Mr. Trimble, one of his employed 
counsel, testified in substance that they saw 
no necessity for a separate defense to be made 
by plaintiff, although it was conceded that it 
had a right to do so if it saw proper. Under 
the testimony, as thus so briefly rehearsed, 
we are in accord with the conclusions of the 
trial judge that plaintiff [surety] is not 
entitled to recoup its expenses in defending 
the action by Christian County sought to be 
recovered by plaintiff in this action. 
Id. at p. 368. 
As in this appeal, the surety in Sentry initially raised 
defenses not raised by the principal in its answer. See Id. at p. 
1073. Also as in this appeal, the surety abandoned its separate 
defenses.9 From that point on "there was no difference between the 
trial position asserted by the principal and the surety." Id. 
The surety in Sentry then sued to recover its attorneys' 
fees totalling $20,381. The trial court awarded the surety only 
$2,685, and the surety appealed. The Sentry court awarded the 
surety only those fees incurred in exploring and asserting matters 
directly relating to the surety,s separate defenses. See Id. at 
1074. The Sentry court affirmed the disallowance of all other 
categories of fees because they had no reasonable and rational 
relation to the surety's liability on the bond. 
9The trial court twice dismissed Industrial's separate 
defenses, first on May 17, 1988 (R. 968-70), and again on March 20, 
1991 (R. 1458-59). 
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The trial court in this case awarded Industrial attorneys' 
fees and costs that were not limited to its independent defenses. 
In doing so, the trial court erred as a matter of law. 
2. Industrial's Counsel Unnecessarily Attended Depositions 
Where They Did Not Participate in Questioning. 
Industrial's separate counsel attended eleven depositions 
(Ex. D-18) concerning the defense of the primary claim by Salt Lake 
City Corporation against James and Hood. Industrial stipulated 
that its counsel conducted no examination at any of those eleven 
deponents. (R. 3674-75). At each deposition, Industrial's counsel 
did nothing but sit. The presence of Industrial's counsel at these 
depositions was unnecessarily duplicative and a waste of time and 
money. 
The Sentry court denied a surety's request for attorney 
fees incurred at depositions that related to the principal's 
defenses on the basis that such attorneys' fees "paid for 
duplicative services" simultaneously being rendered by the 
principal's counsel. See Sentry, 396 N.E.2d at 1074. Because 
Industrial's claim for attorneys' fees includes fees expended for 
its counsel's unproductive attendance at depositions relating to 
Hood and James' defenses, those fees were unreasonable as a matter 
of law. 
3. Industrial's Counsel Billed Over 3 00 Hours for 
Undifferentiated Monitoring and Reporting. 
Industrial's counsel billed 3 01 hours to Industrial for 
reporting and consultation fees (R. 3386-89; Ex. P-l) . Over 250 of 
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those hours consist of consultations with Industrial, which are not 
differentiated from other work their separate counsel performed for 
Industrial, Statements from Industrial's counsel list 102 
consultations or reports made to Industrial by its attorneys 
between 1984 and 1992. (Ex. P-l). 
As a result of the failure of counsel to segregate the 
time descriptions for advising and reporting to Industrial from 
other matters, a factfinder cannot determine the reasonableness of 
the counsel fees for reporting and consultation. Because 
Industrial has the burden of proving the reasonableness of its 
claimed fees, its request for such fees should be denied. See 
Rothev v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., etc.. 754 P. 2d 1222, 1225 (Utah 
1988)(A court may reject attorney billing statements that contain 
charges for unrelated matters or which commingle proper and 
improper charges). See also. Sentry, 396 N.E.2d at p. 1047 (trial 
court should deny all of indemnitee's attorneys' fees for "general 
services not specific in content or purpose.11) 
C. The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law In Concluding 
Industrial Indemnity was Entitled to Prejudgment Interest on its 
Reasonable Attorneys' Fees. 
The April 27, 1988 Stipulation of Industrial Indemnity 
Company, Hood Corporation and B.M. Laulhere explicitly declares 
that Industrial's entitlement to attorneys' fees is governed by an 
overriding requirement of reasonableness: 
Industrial Indemnity shall be entitled to 
further judgment against Hood and Laulhere, 
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jointly and severally, upon motion and 
supporting affidavit, for Industrial's costs 
and reasonable attorneys fees incurred in this 
action or otherwise in connection with the 
described bonds furnished to, for, or at the 
request of James, Hood or Laulhere, subject 
only to the rights of Hood and Laulhere to 
request a hearing with respect to the 
reasonableness of the claimed costs and 
attorneys fees. 
(R. 905-06, Add. 23-24)(emphasis added). 
At the hearing in this matter, the parties presented 
conflicting evidence concerning the reasonableness of the 
attorneys' fees claimed by Industrial. Based on the evidence 
presented at that hearing, the trial court awarded attorneys' fees 
based on its judgment regarding the reasonableness of those fees. 
Because the Stipulation permitted an award of reasonable fees only, 
and because the factfinder had to ascertain that reasonableness, 
the trial court erred when it awarded prejudgment interest on the 
attorneys' fees it awarded Industrial. 
Utah law must provide Industrial's entitlement to prejudgment 
interest. Neither Industrial nor the trial court identified any 
statutory basis for the award of prejudgment interest other than 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1. Section 15-1-1 is silent regarding the 
circumstances under which prejudgment interest is permitted. If 
there is any basis for an award of prejudgment interest on 
reasonable attorneys' fees, it therefore must be in the common law. 
No reported Utah case directly confronts this issue. However, 
in Canyon Country Store v. Bracey. 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989), 
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the Utah Supreme Court affirmed, without discussion, the trial 
court's denial of prejudgment interest on an award of reasonable 
attorneys' fees.10 
In Parents Against Drunk Drivers ("PADD'M v. Graystone Pines 
Homeowners' Ass'n. , 789 P.2d 52, 58-59 (Utah App. 1990), this Court 
came closest to addressing the issue when it indicated that 
prejudgment interest is unavailable if the court must calculate the 
amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded based on the reasonableness 
of those fees, as opposed to an award of attorneys' fees based on 
a fixed amount set forth in a valid attorneys' fee agreement. 
Numerous jurisdictions prohibit an award of prejudgment 
interest on attorneys' fees where the reasonableness of the 
attorneys' fees must first be determined by the factfinder. For 
example, Oklahoma law regarding prejudgment interest is 
functionally identical to the law of Utah. In a recent decision 
interpreting Oklahoma law, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit held: 
10In First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. J. B. J. Feedyards, 
Inc. , 653 P.2d 591, 600 (Utah 1982) the Supreme Court affirmed a 
trial court judgment that, inter alia, awarded prejudgment interest 
on attorneys' fees. J.B.J, is not determinative of this appeal for 
two reasons: (1) the plaintiff therein did not specifically 
challenge the award of prejudgment interest on attorneys' fees and 
the issue was therefore not presented for review; and (2) the trial 
court awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to an arcane common-law 
doctrine requiring an award of attorneys' fees occasioned by a 
wrongful attachment, without any showing of the reasonability of 
those fees. See Id. at p. 597. In the present appeal, the 
Stipulation provided for the payment of only "reasonable" 
attorneys' fees. 
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An award of attorneys7 fees is not a sum 
certain where the reasonableness of those fees 
is still to be determined by the trial court 
. . . Because we hold that the district court 
must determine the reasonableness of the legal 
expenses underlying the HSC assessments, the 
district court's award of prejudgment interest 
is reversed. 
United States v. Hardacre. 985 F.2d 1427, 1438 (10th Cir. 
1993)(applying Oklahoma law)(emphasis added). 
Decisions from numerous other jurisdictions contain the same 
prohibition against awarding prejudgment interest on attorneys7 
fees. See, e.g. , Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878, 693 P.2d 1080, 
1088 (App. 1984)("Of course, no prejudgment interest would accrue 
upon the award of costs and attorney fees"); Kadillak v. Montana 
Dept. of State Lands, 198 Mont. 70, 643 P.2d 1178, 1182-83 
(1982)("The determination of reasonable attorney fees in this case 
was within the discretion of the District Court and the amount was 
not definite or capable of being calculated with certainty prior to 
judgment. Therefore . . .[w]e hold that the District Court 
correctly concluded that there is no authority in Montana for an 
award of prejudgment interest on the discretionary award of 
attorney fees involved in this case."); ALI v. Jefferson Insurance 
Co. , 5 Ohio App.3d 105, 449 N.E.2d 495, 499 (App. 1982) (prejudgment 
interest is not recoverable because "such awards, if proper, would 
have been unliquidated until the date of judgment") ; Tri-M 
Erectors, Inc., v. Drake. 27 Wash.App.2d 529, 618 P.2d 1341, 1346 
(App. 1980)("A claim is unliquidated if the principal must be 
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arrived at by a determination of reasonableness. The question of 
reasonableness of the attorneys' fees expended by Drake was 
determined by the jury. Until that was resolved by the jury, the 
claim was unliquidated . . . Therefore, prejudgment interest on 
attorneys' fees was properly denied by the trial court."); Perkins 
v. Standard Oil Co. of California. 487 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 
1973)("Claims for 'reasonable' attorneys' fees, being unliquidated 
until they are determined by a court, are not entitled to pre-
judgment interest as would be certain liquidated claims.") 
Challenges to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees are 
subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. See, e.g., 
Baldwin v. Burton. 850 P.2d 1188, 1199 (Utah 1993). This abuse of 
discretion standard is incompatible with Utah requirements for an 
award of prejudgment interest. With respect to prejudgment 
interest, the Utah Supreme Court wrote in Canyon Country: 
This Court has repeatedly stated the law of 
Utah as it applies to prejudgment interest: 
[W]here the damage is complete and 
the amount of the loss is fixed as 
of a particular time, and that loss 
can be measured by facts and 
figures, interest should be allowed 
from that time . . . and not from 
the date of judgment. On the other 
hand, where damages are incomplete 
or cannot be calculated with 
mathematical accuracy, . . . the 
amount of the damages must be 
ascertained and assessed by the 
trier of the fact at the trial, and 
in such cases prejudgment interest 
is not allowed. 
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First Sec. Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, 
653 P.2d 591, 600 (Utah 1982)(citing Bjork v. 
April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 
1977), cert, denied, 431 US 930, 97 S.Ct. 
2634, 53 L.Ed. 2d 245 (1977)) (emphasis 
omitted); . . . 
The analysis in determining the 
appropriateness of a prejudgment interest 
award is whether a claim . . . is 
ascertainable with mathematical accuracy. It 
is, of course, axiomatic that all claims can 
be reduced eventually to monetary value. All 
claims would therefore at some point become 
liquidated and theoretically subject to 
prejudgment interest claims. Common sense 
precludes such an interpretation, however. 
Canvon Country, 781 P.2d at p. 422 (emphasis added). If the award 
depends on a determination by the trier of fact, prejudgment 
interest is inappropriate.11 
This court has addressed the critical concept of mathematical 
accuracy in denying a request for prejudgment interest: 
For damages to be calculable with mathematical 
certainty, they must be ascertained 
in accordance with fixed rules of 
evidence and known standards of 
value, which the court or iurv must 
follow in fixing the amount, rather 
than be guided by their best 
judgment in assessing the amount to 
be allowed for past as well as for 
future injury, or for elements that 
cannot be measured by any fixed 
standards of value. 
nThe trial court in this case did not clearly articulate why 
it imposed prejudgment interest. It justified that award only as 
being "subject to and capable of interest calculation." (Finding 
No. 27, R. 3474, Add. 18). 
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On the other hand, interest cannot be allowed 
in cases where "damages are incomplete and are 
peculiarly within the province of the jury to 
assess at the time of the trial." 
Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins. Brown and Gunnell. Inc.. 784 
P.2d 475, 483 (Utah App. 1989)(quoting, Fell v. Union Pacific Ry. 
Co.. 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1006, 1007 (1907))(emphasis added). 
See also. Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.. 848 P.2d 171, 
177-178 (Utah App. 1993). 
Prejudgment interest cannot be allowed in any case, then, 
where the trier of fact must assess an amount at the time of trial. 
In determining the reasonability of an attorneys fee request, a 
trial court is presently required to consider factors12 such as: 
The difficulty of the litigation, the 
efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the 
case, the reasonableness of the number of 
hours spent on the case, the fee customarily 
charged in the locality for similar services, 
the amount involved in the case and the result 
attained, and the expertise and experience of 
the attorneys involved. 
Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985). This is 
exactly the type of ascertainment and assessment by the trier of 
fact that precludes an award of prejudgment interest under Utah 
law. 
12Hood argues in Point VII.A.3., supra. that this list is too 
abbreviated in the indemnitor/indemnitee context. With respect to 
the prejudgment interest issue, however, even these limited factors 
demonstrate that the trier of fact is required to conduct a multi-
faceted exercise of discretion in determining the reasonableness of 
attorneys' fees. 
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Once the trier of fact ascertains and assesses reasonable 
attorneys' fees guided only by its own best judgment, that 
assessment and judgment is subject to the most deferential standard 
of appellate review: abuse of discretion. The most frequently 
cited judicial definition of the word "discretion" comes from the 
case The Steamship Styria. 186 U.S. 1, 22 S.Ct. 731, 46 L.Ed 1027 
(1902). See Rask v. Board of Bar Examiners. 75 N.M. 617, 409 P.2d 
256, 260 (1966). That definition of "discretion" there announced 
by the United States Supreme Court is: 
The term discretion implies the absence of a 
hard-and-fast rule. The establishment of a 
clearly defined rule of action would be the 
end of discretion. and yet discretion should 
not be a word for arbitrary will or 
inconsiderate action. "Discretion means a 
decision of what is just and proper in the 
circumstances.' Bouvier's Law Diet. 
"Discretion means the liberty or power of 
acting without other control than one's own 
judgment." Webster's Diet. 
The Styria. 186 U.S. at p. 9; 22 S.Ct. at p. 734 (emphasis added). 
The concept of judicial discretion therefore precludes an 
award of prejudgment interest where an amount is "peculiarly within 
the province of the [trier of fact] to assess at the time of the 
trial." Fell. 88 P. at 1006. "Discretion" permits no control 
other than the trier of fact's "own judgment", The Styria. 186 U.S. 
at p.9; 22 S.Ct. at p.734; but Utah law prohibits an award of 
prejudgment interest when the amount awarded depends on the "best 
judgment" of the trier of fact. See Anesthesiologists Assoc, of 
Qgden v. St. Benedicts Hospital. 852 P.2d 1030, 1041 (Utah App.) 
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cert, granted. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); Andreason. 848 P.2d at p. 
178. Prejudgment interest is allowed only when a loss is based on 
and measured by a "known standard of value." See Andreason. 848 
P.2d at p. 178. If, however, a loss were measurable by a "known 
standard of value," a determination of that loss would be subject 
to a clearly erroneous standard of review. That, however, is not 
the standard for review of an award of reasonable attorneys' fees. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse, as a matter of law, 
the trial court's award of prejudgment interest. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's judgment. 
DATED: December 3<0 , 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
/SUUL ukJl/SD 
Robert M. Ande^c^ti^)^ 
Bruce Wycoff \J^^^ 
William H. Pruitt 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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On this day of December, 1993, I hereby caused to be 
hand-delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF to the following: 
A, Dennis Norton 
David W. Slaughter 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/&UtL 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., 
et al., 
Defendants. 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Cross-Claimant and 
Third Party Plaintiff,; 
and Appellee, ; 
vs. ] 
HOOD CORPORATION, et al., ; 
Cross- and Third-Party] 
Defendants and ] 
Appellant. ] 
1 Case No. 930452-CA 
Priority 15 
ADDENDUM TO APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
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SCOTT DANIELS (A0813) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Industrial Indemnity 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
MAR 3 0 1S33 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., et 
al. , 
Defendants. 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Cross-Claimant and 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HOOD CORPORATION, et al. 
Cross- and Third-
Party Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-84-2857 
Judge David S. Young 
*\M • k 
On March 4, 1993, a hearing was held to determine 
reasonableness of attorney's fees incurred by Industrial Indemnity 
Company in the above-entitled matter, and the liability of Hood 
Corporation to pay those fees, Judge David S. Young presiding. 
Industrial Indemnity Company was represented by its attorney, Scott 
Daniels. Hood Corporation was represented by its attorney, Robert 
M. Anderson. Witnesses were sworn and called, exhibits were 
admitted and attorneys were allowed to present argument. The Court 
being fully informed in the premises and having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby enters the 
following: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Industrial 
Indemnity Company, have Judgment against Hood Corporation, in the 
amount of $171,316.89, and that interest thereon accrue at the 
Judgment rate of interest, 12% per annum. 
DATED this ffi^day of HAAX^^ ^1993, 
BY THE' COURT: /',\ 
David *£7^ v#ukig, B^trict Judge 
SD\ I nd. I nd\Judgment 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
dU 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., 
PLAINTIFFS, 
-VS-
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
DEFENDANTS. 
^TL4JJ 
CIVIL NO. 84-0902857 
JUDGE'S RULING 
Thi
«%^TS„s 
* * * 
'»&> >ct 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THRUSDAY, THE 4*TH DAY 
OF MARCH, 1993, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 4:55 O'CLOCK 
P.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH. 
* * * 
c 'pas. A
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A E P I A R A . N C . E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: 
FOR THE DEFENDANTS: 
SCOTT DANIELS 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, 11TH FLOOR 
P.O. BOX 3000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110 
ROBERT M. ANDERSON 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
700 KENNECOTT BUILDING 
10 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84133 
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I N D E X 
JUDGE'S RULING PAGE 3 
* * * 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S .R. 
nnnn^* 
2 
r\ r— 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 JUDGE YOUNG: IT'S THE DECISION OF THE COURT THAT 
3 THE PLAINTIFF, OR THE LAW FIRM OF SNOW, CHRISTENSEN AND 
4 MARTINEAU, HAVE ESTABLISHED THAT THEIR FEES ARE BOTH REA-
5 SONABLE AND NECESSARY AS THEY WERE INCURRED IN THIS CASE. 
6 THE COURT FINDS THAT THEY ARE ENTITLED TO FEES IN 
7 THE AMOUNT OF $171,244.84. I AM GOING TO DEDUCT FROM THAT 
8 $5,148.00 AND ADD TO THAT THE NUMBER OF $5,220.00. 
9 I WISH THIS CASE HAD BEEN RESOLVED WITHOUT GOING 
10 TO THAT LEVEL BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT THEIR FIRM APPROPRIATE-
|| LY REPRESENTED THE INTERESTS OF INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY. I DO 
12 BELIEVE THAT INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY HAD SIGNIFICANT REASONS 
13 TO BE INSECURE, THAT THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF HOOD, IN 
14 TERMS OF THEIR NET WORTH BEING PLUS OR MINUS 
15 $20,000,000.00, WHILE IMPRESSIVE, WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY 
j6 SECURE UNDER THE THEORY OF THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT TO GIVE 
17 THE INDEMNITOR, INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, SUFFICIENT 
18 SECURITY TO FEEL THAT THEY COULD LEAVE THE CASE. 
19 I FIND THAT THE SERVICES PERFORMED WERE REASON-
20 ABLE IN ALL RESPECTS AND WERE NECESSARY UNDER THE CIRCUM-
21 STANCES AND I SPECIFICALLY CANNOT FIND THAT AFTER THE FACT 
22 THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO ASSUME THAT THERE WAS A 
23 CERTAIN FACTOR OF UNNECESSARY WORK THAT WAS DONE CONSISTENT 
24 WITH THE TESTIMONY OF MR. MARIGER. 
25 IF YOU WILL PREPARE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER, 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 
'\nnnr' 
1 MR. DANIELS? 
2 MR. DANIELS: YES. MAY I PREPARE FINDINGS OF 
3 FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS WELL? 
4 JUDGE YOUNG: YOU MAY. AND THEY MAY INCLUDE 
5 MATTERS CONSISTENT WITH THE EVIDENCE IN ADDITION TO WHAT 
6 I'VE STATED. 
7 MR. DANIELS: THANK YOU VERY MUCH. 
8 JUDGE YOUNG: COURT'S IN RECESS. 
9 (WHEREUPON, THE JUDGE'S RULING WAS CONCLUDED). 
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EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S .R. 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
SS. 
I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH; THAT AS 
SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, I ATTENDED THE HEARING 
OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME AND PLACE SET 
OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN SHORTHAND THE 
TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD THEREIN; AND THAT 
THEREAFTER I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID SHORTHAND NOTES INTO 
TYPEWRITING, AND THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPTION IS A 
FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE SAME. 
LLOAX OM 
AMBROSE/ C .S .R . 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
JANUARY 14TH, 1996 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 
^ R 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
SS. 
I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH; THAT AS 
SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, I ATTENDED THE HEARING 
OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME AND PLACE SET 
OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN SHORTHAND THE 
TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD THEREIN; AND THAT 
THEREAFTER I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID SHORTHAND NOTES INTO 
TYPEWRITING, AND THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPTION IS A 
FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE SAME. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
JANUARY 14TH, 1996 
EILEEN1 M. AME ;ROSft V 
(Ml. 
MBROSE/ C .S .R . 
NOTARYTUBLIC " 1 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE j 
4749 fdtewiid Road J 
Salt lake City, Utah 84124 { 
My Commission Expires 1/14/961 
STATE OF UTAH I 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C .S .R . 5 
Exhibit C 
SCOTT DANIELS (A0813) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Industrial Indemnity 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Defendant. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., et 
al., 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C-84-2857 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Cross-Claimant and 
Third-Party Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HOOD CORPORATION, et al. 
Cross- and Third-
Party Defendants. 
1 .kiiO a JC iC&i i J J W i C t 
• » - - * »J 
MAR 3 0 J393 
ii/iLJ Lh»l\y^V / / „ , y 
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On March 4, 1993, a hearing was held to determine 
reasonableness of attorney's fees incurred by Industrial Indemnity 
Company in the above-entitled matter, and the liability of Hood 
Corporation to pay those fees, Judge David S. Young presiding. 
Industrial Indemnity Company was represented by its attorney, Scott 
Daniels. Hood Corporation was represented by its attorney, Robert 
M. Anderson, Witnesses were sworn and called, exhibits were 
admitted and the attorneys were allowed to present argument. The 
Court being fully informed in the premises, now hereby enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On April 15, 1981, Industrial Indemnity Company entered 
into an Indemnity Agreement with W.C. James, Inc., Hood 
Corporation, B.M. Laulhere, W.C. James, and Barbara M. James, 
whereby these parties agreed to indemnify Industrial Indemnity for 
any losses, damages, costs, or counsel fees which Industrial 
Indemnity may sustain as a result of surety bonds written on behalf 
of W.C. James, Inc. (now known as James Constructors, Inc.). 
2. On July 8, 1983, James Constructors (hereinafter "James") 
entered into a contract with Salt Lake City Corporation for the 
construction of a project described as Big Cottonwood Extension 
Terminal/Park Transmission Pipeline. 
3. As part of the project contract, Salt Lake City required 
that James furnish contractor performance and payment bonds, which 
-2-
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Industrial Indemnity consequently issued, as surety for James, in 
the amount of $1,128,481.00. 
4. In the Spring of 1984, Salt Lake City Corporation 
declared James in default on the project. 
5. On June 28, 1984, Salt Lake City Corporation filed suit 
against James, Industrial, and Hood, claiming that the work done 
by James was defective. 
6. When Industrial was put on notice of Salt Lake City's 
claim, it retained the firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau to 
investigate the claim and to represent and protect Industrial's 
interest in the litigation, if litigation should arise. Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau was also charged to investigate and defend, 
or to arrange proper defense to, claims or lawsuits by unpaid 
suppliers and subcontractors furnishing labor or material to James 
for the Salt Lake City project. Snow, Christensen & Martineau had 
represented Industrial previously in connection with another claim 
brought against James. 
7. In the Spring and Summer of 1984, A. Dennis Norton, an 
attorney with the firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau conducted 
a good-faith investigation of the failed pipeline on behalf of the 
surety. 
8. After Salt Lake City filed suit and after Norton's 
original investigation, Norton tendered Industrial's defense to 
James, through its attorney, C. Reed Brown. 
-3-
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9. After James1 acceptance of Industrial Indemnity's tender 
of defense, and prior to early 1987, Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau's involvement in the Salt Lake City litigation was 
generally limited to monitoring the case, meeting periodically with 
Mr. Brown, and providing research and other assistance to Mr, 
Brown, at Mr. Brown's request or as otherwise needed as part of 
preparation of trial in the matter. 
10. On or about June 24, 1987, C. Reed Brown withdrew as 
Industrial Indemnity's counsel in this action under the prior 
tender of defense and tendered back the Industrial Indemnity 
defense to Snow, Christensen & Martineau. At that time, Mr. Brown 
told Norton that his withdrawal was prompted by James' likely 
insolvency, and an inability to come to agreement with James' 
parent company, Hood Corporation, concerning payment of 
considerable outstanding legal fees owed to Mr. Brown. 
11. On August 6, 1987, Norton sent a demand letter to Hood 
Corporation demanding that Hood make satisfactory arrangements to 
defend Industrial and to post collateral sufficient to protect 
Industrial from any eventual loss or judgment. 
12. Industrial was entitled to demand collateral under its 
indemnity agreement. 
13. On or about August 25, 1987, Mr. Brown wrote to Norton 
and requested that Industrial re-tender its defense. Norton 
informed Mr. Brown at that time that Industrial intended to defend 
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itself and to level a cross claim against Hood and to join B.M. 
Laulhere as a third-party defendant, unless collateral was posted 
as demanded. 
14, Although Hood had provided a financial statement showing 
it had a large net worth, Industrial Indemnity was justifiably 
concerned as to whether Hood would adequately protect the interests 
of Industrial, These concerns were based upon the fact that James, 
the bond principal, was without assets; that Hood had paid very 
little attention to the Salt Lake City litigation even though its 
exposure approached three million dollars; that Hood did not list 
this very significant and dangerous litigation in its financial 
statement; that Hood had been reluctant to pay Mr. Brown's 
attorney's fees, even though Mr. Brown had vigorously defended 
james and had also accepted tender of the Industrial defense; that 
the defense of Industrial Indemnity had been tendered back to 
Industrial; Hood's stubborn refusal to post collateral or to 
provide other adequate and acceptable security to Industrial; and 
Hood's refusal to authorize or participate in settlement 
negotiations with Salt Lake City Corporation, even though massive 
failures had occurred in the pipeline project and the City had 
removed and re-laid virtually the entire pipeline. Under these 
circumstances, it was not unreasonable for Industrial to determine 
that it was necessary to defend itself in the litigation to protect 
and preserve its interests. 
-5-
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15. On April 4, 1988, Industrial and Hood entered into a 
Stipulation resolving the indemnity claims raised on Industrial's 
cross-claim and third-party complaint against Hood and Laulhere. 
Under the terms of the Stipulation, Industrial agreed not to 
require Hood and Laulhere to post collateral. In exchange, Hood 
and Laulhere agreed that Industrial could have judgment over 
against Hood in the event Salt Lake City obtained judgment against 
Industrial, and that Industrial would also be entitled to judgment 
against Hood for Industrial's costs and reasonable attorney's fees 
incurred in this action or otherwise in connection with bonds 
furnished for James, subject only to the right of Hood to submit 
the question of reasonableness of those fees and costs to the Court 
for determination. 
16. Following April 1988, Industrial Indemnity continued to 
be represented by its separate counsel, but agreed to permit Hood 
and James to take the lead in the continuing litigation with Salt 
Lake City, providing support and assistance, as appropriate, and 
as generally consistent with the defendants' collective defense 
strategy. 
17. The firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau thereafter 
limited its participation in the case until October of 1990, when 
it was agreed among counsel for Hood, James and Industrial that 
Industrial would attempt to re-assert its independent defenses to 
the suit. Counsel for defendants determined that if Industrial 
-6-
00001 \ 
Indemnity were successful in that effort, the success would inure 
to the benefit of the indemnitors, including Hood. For a brief 
period of time following this October 1990 agreement, and as part 
of a pretrial effort to define and preserve issues for trial, Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau was involved in the case in asserting these 
defenses. The decision to more heavily involve Industrial and its 
counsel in the case was reasonable under the circumstances and was 
agreed to by James and Hood. 
18. All of the legal fees and costs for services rendered for 
Industrial Indemnity Company and related to the James file were 
recorded on daily time records and were in turn combined with 
separate cost accounting records relating to costs advanced on 
behalf of Industrial Indemnity to create itemized statements. 
19. The itemization of services and costs contained on these 
statements accurately reflect services actually rendered and costs 
actually advanced between December 23, 1982 and April 7, 1992. 
Fees over that period of time totaled $104,858.11 and costs totaled 
$5,099.50. 
20. Some of the fees and costs recorded in those statements 
do not relate specifically to the Salt Lake City matter and should 
be deducted from the total. These fees and costs amount to 
$5,148.00. 
-7-
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21. Industrial Indemnity paid all of the amounts billed on 
these statements shortly after the time that the statements were 
each sent. 
22. The fees charged to and paid by Industrial Indemnity were 
based on time spent, calculated at hourly rates for the attorneys 
involved. These services were rendered primarily by A. Dennis 
Norton, David W. Slaughter and Max D. Wheeler. The hourly rates 
for these attorneys over the period of their involvement are set 
out below: 
A. DENNIS NORTON 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1983 
1984 
MAX P. 
DAVID W. 
$ 
WHEELER 
$ 
SLAUGHTER 
$ 
100.00 
110.00 
120.00 
130.00 
135.00 
140.00 
145.00 
150.00 
155.00 
160.00 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
120.00 
125.00 
130.00 
135.00 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
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1985 85.00 
1986 95.00 
1987 105.00 
1988 110.00 
1989 115.00 
1990 125.00 
1991 130.00 
1992 135.00 
23. In addition to the amounts set forth on these bills, 
Industrial Indemnity has incurred further expenses in preparation 
for the hearing on attorney's fees. These include the legal 
efforts and testimony by three attorneys listed above and in 
addition, the services of Scott Daniels, whose hourly rate is 
$135.00. A reasonable attorneys fee in preparing for this hearing 
is $5,220.00. 
24. All of the hourly rates charged by the attorneys for 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau are reasonable, considering the 
experience of the attorney involved and the complexity of the 
matter. 
25. The fees and costs expended by Industrial, as set forth 
in the statements of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, were both 
reasonable and necessary, considering the complexity of the matter, 
the reasonableness of the decision of Industrial to defend itself, 
the reasonableness of the investigation which needed to be done, 
the reasonableness of the decision and agreement to assert 
Industrial's independent defenses, and the dispute regarding the 
amount of attorney's fees. 
-9-
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26. Industrial's attorney fees are also reasonable in light 
of the fact that they were incurred over a ten-year period, the 
litigation was very complex, and the other defendants expended 
$626,065.62 in defense costs. 
27. The amounts paid by Industrial were liquidated and 
certain in amount as of the dates paid, were actually paid by 
Industrial on known and established dates, and are subject to and 
capable of interest calculation. 
28. Interest, calculated at 10% simple interest from the date 
each payment was received from Industrial by Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau to the date of this hearing amounts to $56,139.23. 
29. In light of all the factors, the court concludes that a 
total of fees and costs of $171,316.89 is reasonable, and was 
actually and necessarily incurred by Industrial in defense of this 
action. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Industrial is entitled to recover from Hood under the 
Indemnity Agreement of April 15, 1981, and the Stipulation of April 
4, 1988, total attorney's fees and costs in the principal amount 
of $115,177.61; and 
2. As part of its reasonable fees and costs, Industrial is 
further entitled to recover from Hood pre-judgment interest on all 
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fee expenditures at the simple rate of 10% per annum, calculated 
from the date of fee payments, for a total amount of $56,139.23. 
3. Judgment should be entered accordingly, against Hood 
Corporation and in favor of Industrial Indemnity Company in the 
total amount of $171,316.89, and that interest thereon should 
accrue, from the date the Judgment is entered, at the judgment rate 
of interest, 12% per annum. 
DATED this j&^day of fj/k^oL , 1993. 
BY THE COURTS 
SD\Ind.Ind.Conclusions 
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MAX D. WHEELER (A3439) 
DAVID W. SLAUGHTER (A2977) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Industrial Indemnity 
Company 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., a 
Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a 
municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah, 
STIPULATION OF INDUSTRIAL 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, HOOD 
CORPORATION AND 3. M. 
LAULHERE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., et 
al., 
Defendants. 
No .-^ €-06-2057 
Judge David S. Young 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, a 
California corporation, 
Cross-Claimant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs 
00002C QGCSCS 
HOOD CORPORATION, et al. 
Cross- and Third-Party 
Defendants. 
COME NOW Industrial Indemnity Company ("Industrial"), a 
California corporation and third-party plaintiff, cross-
defendant Hood Corporation ("Hood"), and third-party defendant 
B. M. Laulhere ("Laulhere"), and agree and stipulate as follows: 
1. On or about April 15, 1981, Hood and Laulhere (the 
"Indemnitors") each executed a Contract of Indemnity (General) 
(the "Indemnity Agreement") by which Indemnitors agreed to 
indemnify Industrial, and to hold it harmless from, among other 
things, "any and all liabilities, claims, demands, losses, 
damages, costs, attorneys fees, judgments and expenses of 
whatever kind or nature" that Industrial might sustain or incur 
by reason of or in consequence of Industrial's issuance of 
bonds for work performed or to be performed by James 
Constructors, Inc., one of Hood's subsidiary companies. The 
Indemnity Agreement also entitles Industrial to require the 
Indemnitors to post collateral in the amount of any claim made 
against Industrial's bonds,together with a reasonable sum for 
costs and attorneys' fees. 
2. Relying upon the Indemnity Agreement, Industrial 
issued certain contractor performance and payment bonds in the 
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face amount of $1,128,481.00 in connection with a contract 
between James Constructors, Inc., and the City of Salt Lake, 
Utah, for a project known generally as the "Terminal Park Water 
Transmission Pipeline, Water Main Extension No. 35-4184." 
3. The undersigned parties stipulate and agree that the 
Indemnity Agreement signed by Hood and Laulhere covers the 
bonds above described and that pursuant to said Indemnity 
Agreement Hood and Laulhere are liable for any payments 
Industrial may be obligated to make pursuant to the terms of 
the bonds, together with other costs and reasonable attorneys' 
fees incurred by Industrial in connection with those claims. 
4. By a Verified Complaint dated June 28, 1984, Salt Lake 
City Corporation filed suit against James Constructors, Inc., 
and Industrial (the "Complaint") alleging, among other things, 
that there was a failure of performance under the construction 
contract described in paragraph 2 above. The Complaint claims 
damages against Industrial under the bonds in a sum in excess 
of $2,000,000. 
5. By Crossclaim and Third-Party Complaint in this 
action, Industrial seeks indemnification from Indemnitors and 
otherwise seeks enforcement of its rights under the Indemnity 
Agreement. 
6. It is the desire of the parties to this Stipulation to 
resolve some of the issues presented under the Indemnity 
-3-
Agreement and the Crossclaim/Third-Party Complaint without 
litigation, and without entwining those issues with the under-
lying claims and issues in the suit by Salt Lake Corporation. 
Accordingly, the parties hereby agree to a complete resolution 
of the specified claims raised by Crossclaim/Third Party 
Complaint or otherwise related to Indemnitors' obligations of 
indemnity as hereinafter set forth. 
7. Hood and Laulhere hereby waive any defenses that they 
might assert, now or hereafter, to the Indemnity Agreement, and 
jointly and severally agree and stipulate that if Salt Lake 
City Corporation obtains a judgment against Industrial on the 
underlying claims of the Complaint, the Court, upon ex parte 
application by Industrial Indemnity, and without further notice 
to Indemnitors, shall enter an immediate and final judgment in 
like amount over in favor of Industrial and against Indemnitors 
Hood and Laulhere jointly and severally. 
8. Independent of and in addition to the amount of any 
judgment over against Indemnitors as outlined in paragraph 7 
above, Industrial Indemnity shall be entitled to further judg-
ment against Hood and Laulhere, jointly and severally, upon 
motion and supporting affidavit, for Industrial's costs and 
reasonable attorneys fees incurred in this action or otherwise 
in connection with the described bonds furnished to, for, or at 
the request of James, Hood or Laulhere, subject only to rights 
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of Hood and Laulhere to request a hearing with respect to the 
reasonableness of the claimed costs and attorneys fees. All 
parties agree to be bound by the Court's determination of 
reasonableness. 
9. Joint and several execution may issue immediately upon 
entry of judgments pursuant to paragraphs 7 and 8 above. 
10. In addition to all of the foregoing, Indemnitors Hood 
and Laulhere confirm their obligations to hold Industrial 
Indemnity harmless from any enforcement of and execution upon 
that judgment entered against James Constructors and Industrial 
Indemnity in favor of Ortega Ru in that certain action, also 
involving claims on the described bonds, entitled Ortega-Ru v. 
James Constructors, et al., Third District (Utah) Case 
No. , and currently on appeal before the Utah Supreme 
Court. Industrial Indemnity may have judgment (or may supple-
ment judgment) against indemnitors Hood and Laulhere in accor-
dance with paragraph 7 above in the event of affirmance of the 
Ortega-Ru judgment and in the amount of any demand or execution 
upon Industrial Indemnity in payment and enforcement of said 
judgment. 
11. As consideration for Hood and Laulhere's Stipulation 
hereunder, Industrial agrees not to require the posting of 
collateral or other security under the Indemnity Agreement, 
unless the net worth of Hood Corporation deteriorates more than 
nnnnr ! v 
twenty percent (20%) from its 1987 tax year end audited 
financial statement. Hood and Laulhere shall submit financial 
statements and other proof of financial condition at any time 
at the request of Industrial. 
12. Industrial Indemnity specifically reserves all rights 
under the Indemnity Agreement. 
DATED this /f^day of April, 1988. 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY yyjci^t^^ 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
COUNTY OF tfaJ^^a/^ ) 
Aft(?e/wy<; 
ss 
On t h e /$ day of A p r i l , 1988, p e r s o n a l l y appeared be fo re 
me /r /J^?/)Zr /T^Y^^ t he /Z&vWfii/ Jzl/er 
:dzeqc Industrial Indemnity, who duly signed the fo4regoing Stipulation 
on behalf of Industrial Indemnity, and states that it is true 
and correct as to his information, knowledge and belief. 
YPMLIC 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
7//s/r? 
NOTAR  
R e s i d i n g 7 a t J?7 /^- /L*A?e. ^u^-A-,, ^A/C 
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HOOD CORPORATION 
(A^ 
Its 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF rns ANranra ) 
On the 14th day of April, 1988, personally appeared before 
me Marc Laulhere / the President of Hood 
Corporation, who duly signed the foregoing Stipulation on behalf 
of Hood Corporation, and states that it is true and correct as 
to his information, knowledge and belief. 
My Commission Expires; 
June 7, 1989 
V / / 
u
 Whit t le / . Call 
NOTARY PUBLI 
R e s i d i n g a t fornia 
gttTgrWC zzxa 
OFFICIAL SEAL 8 
BEVERLY J YACKS 5{ 
NOTARY PUBLIC-CALIFORNIA 
PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN g 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY " 
My Comm Expires June 7, 1989 
OJQ0C»3Cg,7ffWIOr 3 J P J ^ W S ^ C U 
STATE OF _ 
COUNTY OF 
On the 
) 
B. M. LAULHERE 
ss. 
day of April, 1988, personally appeared before 
me B. M. Laulhere, who duly acknowledged to me that he signed 
-7- QOLSCC 
the foregoing Stipulation, and that the same is true as to his 
information, knowledge and belief. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at _ 
My Commission Expires 
SCMDS142 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
(jtMJgf^L 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, 
CROSS-CLAIMANT AND 
THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF, 
-VS-
HOOD CORPORATION, ET AL., 
CROSS AND THIRD-PARTY 
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANT, 
CIVIL NO. C-84-090-28 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
57 
BE IT REMEMERED THAT ON THURSDAY, THE 4TH DAY 
OF MARCH, 1993, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 8:30 O'CLOCK 
A.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS-
TRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH. 
n i *5 2?$TiBfC? COURT 
Third Judicial Oistnct 
AUG 2 6 m 
By 
^UJ./^ wot 
• C M » i/y 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R OCT 1 2 1993 
nnr\n<?^ COURT**r*« ADOIC A i ©356.4 
1 THESE MATTERS? 
2
 A AS I HAVE TESTIFIED EARLIER IT IS BASICALLY THE 
3 WORK I'VE BEEN DOING FOR A LONG, LONG TIME. I FEEL NOW 
4 AND FELT THEN THAT I UNDERSTOOD WHAT THE ISSUES WERE AND 
5 THAT I COULD HANDLE THIS KIND OF A CASE ECONOMICALLY. AND 
6 I BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS NO LEARNING CURVE WHATEVER INVOLVED 
7 IN UNDERTAKING THIS CASE EITHER BY ME OR BY MR. SLAUGHTER 
8 OR FOR THE AREA THAT MR. WHEELER HANDLED IN HIS AREA EITHER. 
9 Q YOU HANDLED HUNDREDS OF SURETY CASES. WAS THIS 
10 PRETTY TYPICAL OF A CASE, RUN OF THE MILL, THAT YOU'VE 
11 HANDLED? 
12 A NO, THIS WAS NOT TYPICAL AT ALL. 
13 Q WHY WASN'T IT TYPICAL? 
14 A IN THE BEGINNING OUR FIRST NOTICE OF THE CASE 
15 WAS, I BELIEVE, ABOUT MAY OF 198^, AND WHAT WE HAD IN UTAH 
16 WAS AN ENTITY CALLED JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., TO MY KNOW-
17 LEDGE, HAD LITTLE OR NO ASSETS IN IT. THE INDEMNITY AGREE-
18 MENT, HOWEVER, HAD BOTH HOOD CORPORATION, AND A LARGE CORPOR 
19 ATION IN CALIFORNIA, AND ITS PRINCIPAL OWNER ON IT. 
20 Q MAYBE WE SHOULD GET THAT IN EVIDENCE BEFORE WE 
21 GO ANY FURTHER. 
22 MR. ANDERSON: I'LL STIPULATE. 
23 JUDGE YOUNG: THIS WILL BE P-5 AND THIS IS THE 
24 UNDERLYING INDEMNITY AGREEMENT? 
25 MR. DANIELS: IT'S THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT. 
16 
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1 JUDGE YOUNG: MAYBE WITH THE LAST TESTIMONY OF 
2 MR. NORTON AS TO THE STATUS, FINANCIAL STATUS OF JAMES, 
3 PERHAPS I WAS RIGHT WHEN I CALLED THIS JAMES CONSTRICTORS 
4 IN THE FIRST OF THE CALLING OF THE CASE, RIGHT? 
5 MR. ANDERSON: WELL, THE WAY THE PARTIES KEEP 
6 SHIFTING WE GOT PLAINTIFFS, DEFENDANTS, CROSS-CLAIMS, SO 
7 WE NEED TO REFER TO THEM BY THE PROPER NAMES. 
8 THE WITNESS: THE EXHIBIT, P-5, IS THE CONTRACT 
9 OF INDEMNITY AND IT HAS AS INDEMNITORS W.C. JAMES, INC., 
10 HOOD CORPORATION AND B.M. LAULHERE WHO WAS THE PRINCIPAL 
11 OWNER AT THAT TIME. 
12 Q (BY MR. DANIELS) OKAY. SO JAMES CONSTRUCTORS 
13 WAS THE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, THE PRINCIPAL; INDUSTRIAL 
14 INDEMNITY WAS THE SURETY AND HOW DID HOOD RELATE TO THAT? 
15 A AND HOOD WAS AN INDEMNITOR TO INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY] 
16 COMPANY AND, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, A WHOLLY OWNED PARENT OF 
17 JAMES. 
18 Q so JAMES HAD NO ASSETS BUT WAS WHOLLY OWNED BY 
19 HOOD AND HOOD HAS SIGNED THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT. 
20 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
21 Q ALONG WITH MR. LAULHERE? 
22 A MR. LAULHERE. 
23 Q LAULHERE. 
24 A AND JAMES. 
25 Q WHO'S HE? 
17 
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1 NEY, MET WITH THE CITY ENGINEERS, REVIEWED THE INFORMATION, 
2 CONTACTED A CONSTRUCTION CONSULTANT AND WE WALKED THE JOB 
3 AND TOOK SOME PICTURES AND LOOKED OVER THE SITUATION. AND 
4 IT WAS VERY OBVIOUS THAT THERE WAS A MASSIVE FAILURE--THAT 
5 DOESN'T GO TO CAUSATION, BUT THERE WAS A MASSIVE FAILURE. 
6
 Q ON THE PIPELINE? 
7 A OF THE PIPELINE. YES. WE'VE EITHER TOOK OR 
8 SAW PICTURES OF CARS FALLING DOWN INTO THE COMPLETED AND 
9 PAVED TRENCH THAT HAD CAVED DOWN SEVERAL FEEL BELOW THE 
10 SURFACE, THE OTHERWISE SURFACE. AND SO IT WAS OBVIOUS WE 
11 HAD A PROBLEM TO DEAL WITH. IT WAS NOT A SMALL CASE. THE 
12 BOND WAS SLIGHTLY UNDER 1.3 MILLION DOLLARS BUT THE CITY 
13 CONTENDED THAT IT WAS SPENDING MORE THAN TWO MILLION DOLLARS 
14 TO RE-DO THE WORK AND, IN FACT, THE CITY TORE OUT THE WHOLE 
15 PIPELINE AND REPLACED THE WHOLE THING. AND SO I CONSIDERED 
16 IT A NASTY, DANGEROUS CASE. 
17 NOW I'VE BEEN INVOLVED IN NASTY, DANGEROUS CASES 
18 BEFORE, BUT THE DIFFERENCE HERE WAS THAT HOOD CORPORATION 
19 SEEMED UNINTERESTED IN WHAT WAS HAPPENING OUT HERE AND HAD 
20 LET THE DEFENSE OF THE CASE TO JAMES WHO, AT THAT POINT, 
21 CONSISTED OF THE PRESIDENT OF JAMES, A FELLOW NAMED JIM 
22 FOREMAN, AND HIS SECRETARY. AND JAMES HAD HIRED REED BROWN 
23 AS ITS ATTORNEY AND THEY WERE BUSILY DEFENDING THIS CASE. 
24 BUT WE KNEW, AND JAMES KNEW THAT JAMES COULDN'T PAY ANY 
25 JUDGMENTS AND WE TRIED TO INTEREST HOOD CORPORATION IN THE 
19 
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1 CASE TO COME OUT, INVESTIGATE, DO SOME INDEPENDENT WORK 
2 TO SEE WHAT, TO SEE WHAT THE EXPOSURE REALLY WAS RATHER 
3 THAN RELYING ON THE GUY WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF THE PROJECT. 
4 AND WE COULDN'T GET THAT INTEREST. 
5 Q AS AN ATTORNEY REPRESENTING THE SURETY DID YOU 
6 FEEL YOU HAD A DUTY TO DO AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION? 
7 A YES. THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
8 THAT HAS BEEN IMPOSED ON INSURANCE COMPANIES HAS ALSO BEEN 
9 IMPOSED ON SURETY COMPANIES. MAINLY BECAUSE SURETY COMPANIES 
10 WERE LUMPED IN STATE INSURANCE CODES AS INSURERS. SURETIES 
11 AREN'T INSURERS BUT THEY'RE PART OF THE INSURANCE CODE. 
12 AND, IN ANY EVENT, THE CASES AROUND THE COUNTRY HAVE MADE 
13 IT PRETY CLEAR NOW THAT A SURETY HAS A DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 
14 AND FAIR DEALING AND PART OF THAT DUTY -IS TO INDEPENDENTLY 
15 EXAMINE THE PROJECT, WHAT THE PROBLEMS ARE, AND TO MAKE 
16 AN EVALUATION AND TO TAKE AN ACTIVE PART RATHER THAN MERELY 
17 TENDER. AND SO IN THE OLD DAYS WHEN SURETY LAWYERS DIDN'T 
18 HAVE MUCH TO DO THEY JUST TENDERED TO THE PRINCIPAL. IN 
19 THIS DAY AND AGE WE DON'T HAVE THAT LUXURY. WE HAVE TO, 
20 EVEN ON SMALL CLAIMS, EVEN ON SUBCONTRACTOR'S CLAIMS, WE 
21 HAVE A DUTY TO GO OUT AND INDEPENDENTLY FIND OUT IF WE CAN, 
22 WHAT HAPPENED. AND THAT MEANS ALSO, IN A NUMBER OF STATES, 
23 INCLUDING CALIFORNIA, HAVE SAID THAT WE CAN'T RELY ON THE 
24 REPRESENTATIONS OF OUR PRINCIPAL OBLIGOR, IN THIS CASE, 
25 JAMES. WE CAN'T RELY ON WHAT THEY SAY. WE HAVE TO CONDUCT 
20 
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1 OUR OWN INVESTIGATION AND THAT'S WHAT I ATTEMPTED TO DO. 
2 Q WELL—AND WHAT DID YOU DO TO TRY TO GET HOOD 
3 INVOLVED AND INTERESTED IN THE LAWSUIT? 
4 A REED BROWN WAS THE ATTORNEY REPRESENTING JAMES 
5 AND DEALING WITH BOTH JAMES AND HOOD AT THAT TIME. AND 
6 VERY EARLY IN OUR INVESTIGATIONS WE SAW THAT THE EXPOSURE, 
7 THE POTENTIAL EXPOSURE TO DAMAGES WAS VERY GREAT. AND WE 
8 TRIED TO GET MR. BROWN TO GET HOOD CORPORATION UP HERE TO 
9 INDEPENDENTLY TAKE A LOOK AT IT AND INDEPENDENTLY ASSESS 
10 ITS EXPOSURE BECAUSE HOOD WOULD EVENTUALLY BE PAYING IT, 
11 WE HOPED. 
12 Q I SEE. WELL NOW, AS I LOOK AT THE CHART, P-**, 
13 IT SEEMS TO BE PRETTY FLAT ON THE BOTTOM AND THERE'S THREE 
14 AREAS OF ACTIVITY. SIMILARLY, LOOKING AT P-3 I SEE THREE 
15 AREAS WHERE THERE'S SOME SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF FEES. THIS 
16 TIME PERIOD WHEN YOU WERE DOING THE INVESTIGATION, WHEN 
17 DID THAT TAKE PLACE? 
18 A THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN BEGINNING ABOUT THE END 
19 OF MAY 1ST OR JUNE OF ' 8*f. 
20 Q ABOUT HERE? 
21 A YES. AND THEN OVER APPROXIMATELY THE NEXT SEVERA 
22 MONTHS. 
23 Q so THIS AREA HERE IS YOUR AREA, AND I'M REFERRING 
24 FOR THE RECORD TO EXHIBIT P-h, THE FIRST, TO THE FAR LEFT, 
25 THE BAR GRAPHS, AND P-3, THE LITTLE PEAKS. THIS AREA OF 
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1 TIME WAS A TIME WHEN YOU WERE DOING YOUR INDEPENDENT INVESTI-
2 GATION? 
3 A THAT'S RIGHT. AND I PERSONALLY DID ALMOST ALL 
4 OF IT DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME. I INVOLVED A CONSTRUCTION 
5 CONSULTANT, ALSO MET EXTENSIVELY WITH REED BROWN, AND AT 
6 SOME EARLY POINT IN THAT PROCESS WE RENDERED THE DEFENSE 
7 TO JAMES AND MR. BROWN OBJECTED TO THE TENDER. AND SO HE 
8 AND I THEN DISCUSSED THE NATURE OF HIS OBJECTION. AND THE 
9 NATURE OF HIS OBJECTION WAS THAT IT WAS A SMALL OFFICE AND 
10 A BIG, DANGEROUS CASE AND HE REQUESTED OUR INVOLVEMENT IN 
11 IT. MY PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT TO ASSIST HIM AS HE DEFENDED 
12 JAMES. AND SO MR. BROWN AND I WORKED TOGETHER AND HE WORKED 
13 VERY HARD IN DEFENDING JAMES THROUGH THIS PERIOD. 
14 Q LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED EXHIBIT 6 
15 AND 7. EXHIBIT 6 PURPORTS TO BE A LETTER FROM YOU TO MR. 
16 BROWN. 
17 A YES. EXHIBIT 6 IS MY TENDER LETTER TO HIM AND 
18 EXHIBIT 7 IS A LETTER BACK TWO DAYS LATER OBJECTING TO THE 
19 TENDER AND SUGGESTING THAT WE SHOULD STAY INVOLVED. AND 
20 J THEN WE HAD A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION AT LEAST, SHORTLY AFTER 
HIS LETTER, AND HE AGREED TO ACCEPT THE TENDER. HE, AT 
FIRST, WAS UNDER THE MISAPPREHENSION THAT IT WAS A POLICY 
23
 I OF INSURANCE AND WE HAD SOME DUTY TO COME IN AND DEFEND, 
24 AND AS WE DISCUSSED IT HE SAW THAT IT WASN'T AND, IN FACT, 
25 THERE'S AN INDEMNITY AGREEMENT, BUT HE NEVERTHELESS REQUESTER 
22 
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THAT WE STAY IN THE CASE, ASSIST HIM IN THE DEFENSE AND 
WORK TOGETHER TO TRY TO RESOLVE IT. 
Q OKAY. SO EXHIBIT 6, AFTER YOU WERE SERVED, YOU 
TENDERED THE DEFENSE TO MR. BROWN TO HANDLE? 
A YES. 
MR. DANIELS: THAT'S EXHIBIT 6. WE WILL OFFER 
EXHIBIT 6, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. ANDERSON: 
JUDGE YOUNG: 
MR. DANIELS: 
NO OBJECTION. 
P-6 IS RECEIVED. 
THANK YOU. 
(WHEREUPON, PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 
NO. 6 WAS OFFERED AND RECEIVED 
INTO EVIDENCE). 
Q (BY MR. DANIELS) AND THEN EXHIBIT 7 IS WHEN 
MR. BROWN IMMEDIATELY WRITES BACK AND SAID NO, THERE WAS 
A MISUNDERSTANDING HERE, YOU'RE GOING TO DEFEND JAMES CON-
STRUCTORS; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. AND AT THIS TIME MR. DAVID— 
MR. ANDERSON: I'LL OBJECT. THERE'S NO QUESTION, 
CALLING FOR A RESPONSE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THE OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED. 
MR. DANIELS: OKAY. 
Q (BY MR. DANIELS) SO EXHIBIT 7 IS WHEN HE SORT 
OF REJECTS YOUR TENDER. 
A THAT'S RIGHT. AND AT THE SAME TIME— 
23 
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1 MR. ANDERSON: I'LL STIPULATE TO THE ADMISSION 
2 OF 7. 
3 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. P-7 IS RECEIVED. 
4 (WHEREUPON, PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 
NO. 7 WAS OFFERED AND RECEIVED 
5 INTO EVIDENCE). 
6 
7 MR. DANIELS: OKAY. 
8 Q (BY MR. DANIELS) EXHIBIT 7 THEN--THEN YOU HAD 
9 THIS CONVERSATION WITH MR. BROWN AFTER THAT TIME. 
10 A AND IN THAT CONVERSATION HE TOLD ME THAT DAVID 
11 REEVE WOULD NOW BE REPRESENTING HOOD CORPORATION SEPARATELY. 
12 Q OKAY. DID YOU DISCUSS WITH HIM THE FACT THAT 
13 EVENTUALLY HOOD WOULD BE PAYING FOR YOUR ATTORNEY'S FEES? 
14 A YES. 
15 Q WAS THAT UNDERSTOOD BY MR. BROWN AS YOU UNDERSTOOD^ 
16 HIM? 
17 A YES. 
18 Q AND THEN HE ALSO SAID THAT--WHAT WAS THE REASON 
19 WHY HE WANTED INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY AND SNOW, CHRISTENSEN 
20 & MARTINEAU INVOLVED? 
21 A HE WANTED THE ASSISTANCE OF OUR LAW FIRM IN THE 
22 DEFENSE OF THE CASE. 
23 Q HE WAS ESSENTIALLY A ONE-MAN OPERATION AT THAT 
24 TIME AND BACKUP--
25 A YES, I BELIEVE SO. 
24 
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THAT THE PIPELINE-
MR. ANDERSON: I'M GOING TO OBJECT ON HEARSAY 
GROUNDS. I THINK WE'RE GOING WAY FAR AFIELD. 
JUDGE YOUNG: AND I'M NOT SO SURE IT'S REALLY 
RELEVANT. I THINK THERE IS AN ADEQUATE FOUNDATION AS TO 
WHAT THEY WERE DOING AND MAYBE CROSS-EXAMINATION WOULD FOCUS 
ON HOOD'S CONCERNS. 
MR. DANIELS: OKAY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME ASK YOU THIS, MR. NORTON. 
FROM THE TIME WHEN YOU EARLIEST TENDERED THE DEFENSE TO 
HOOD THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO REASON THAT THEY COULD NOT 
HAVE SIMPLY STEPPED FORWARD, AND SINCE THEY WERE POTENTIALLY 
ON THE LINE HAVE TAKEN OVER AND RETAINED THEIR OWN COUNSEL 
TO DO THAT WHICH YOU WERE ULTIMATELY DOING THEREAFTER, ISN'T 
THAT CORRECT? 
THE WITNESS: YES. THEY WERE--THE PROBLEM WAS 
THAT WE HAD JAMES BEING DEFENDED AND HOOD NOT COMING FORWARD 
IN ANY CAPACITY. AND THAT RAISED MY STRESS LEVEL AND THAT 
OF MY CLIENT BECAUSE HOOD--AND THEN WHEN HOOD FINALLY DID 
COME FORWARD IT WAS THROUGH DAVID REEVE WHO WAS NEVER 
INVOLVED ENOUGH IN THE CASE TO KEEP TRACK OF IT. 
Q (BY MR. DANIELS) WERE YOU TRYING TO TELL HOOD 
THAT THEY HAD A SERIOUS EXPOSURE ON THIS CASE? 
A YES. AND IN THE BEGINNING, THROUGH REED BROWN 
AND THEN LATER IN A MEETING WHEN WE ACTUALLY, WHEN BROWN 
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1 REVERSED THE TENDER IN '87 AND WE JOINED THE INDEMNITORS 
2 IN THE ACTION, WE HAD A DIRECTED MEETING WITH MARK LAULHERE 
3 IN SALT LAKE CITY, AND WE ARRANGED TO MEET HIM. AND AT 
4 THE MEETING MYSELF, DAVID SLAUGHTER, MAX WHEELER, ELWOOD 
5 POWELL, DAVID REEVE AND REED BROWN WERE ALL THERE TO TRY 
6 TO IMPRESS UPON MR. LAULHERE THE GRAVITY OF THE CASE. 
7 Q WITHOUT SUCCESS? 
8 A AT THAT TIME, YES. 
9 Q YOU REFERRED TO THE TIME WHEN MR. BROWN TENDERED 
10 THE DEFENSE BACK TO YOU. LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT HAS BEEN 
11 MARKED EXHIBIT 10 AND ASK YOU IF YOU CAN IDENTIFY THAT 
12 LETTER. 
13 A YES, THIS IS THE LETTER IN WHICH HE ADVISED ME 
14 IN WRITING THAT--PM LOOKING FOR THE LANGUAGE, I AM TENDERINGJ 
15 BACK TO YOU THE DEFENSE OF INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY IN THE SALT 
16 LAKE CITY LAWSUIT. 
17 Q DID YOU TALK TO MR. BROWN AS WELL? 
18 A YES. 
19 MR. DANIELS: LET ME OFFER'THAT LETTER, EXHIBIT 
20 io, YOUR HONOR. 
21 MR. ANDERSON: NO OBJECTION. 
22 JUDGE YOUNG: 10-P IS RECEIVED. 
23 I (WHEREUPON, PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 
NO. 10 WAS OFFERED AND RECEIVED 
24 | INTO EVIDENCE). 
25 
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1 Q CBY MR. DANIELS) ALL RIGHT. AND WHAT DID HE 
2 TELL YOU IN ADDITION TO WHAT'S IN THE LETTER? 
3 A WELL, THE FRUSTRATION--
4 MR. ANDERSON: OBJECTION. NO FOUNDATION. 
5 MR. DANIELS: ALL RIGHT. 
6 Q (BY MR. DANIELS) DID YOU HAVE A CONVERSATION 
7 WITH MR. BROWN? 
8 A YES. 
9 Q WAS THAT A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION OR WAS IT IN 
10 PERSON? 
11 A BOTH. 
12 Q ALL RIGHT. CAN YOU FOCUS YOUR MIND ON THE FIRST 
13 OF THOSE CONVERSATIONS AND TELL ME WHETHER IT WAS A TELEPHONE 
14 CONVERSATION OR A PERSONAL. 
15 A IT WAS A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION. 
16 Q WAS THERE ANYONE ON THE PHONE BESIDES YOU AND 
17 HIM? 
18 A NO. 
19 Q ABOUT WHEN DID IT TAKE PLACE? 
20 A WITHIN TWO DAYS, I WOULD SAY, OF THE DATE OF 
21 THE LETTER, JUNE 24TH. 
22 Q ALL RIGHT. WHAT DID YOU SAY AND WHAT DID HE 
23 SAY? 
24 A WELL, I, OF COURSE, SAID, WHY ARE YOU WITHDRAWING 
25 AND BECAUSE IT WAS MORE THAN A MATTER OF MERE CURIOSITY 
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1 BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN —YOU'LL NOTICE A TWO-YEAR PERIOD THERE 
2 VERY LITTLE HAD BEEN DONE BY OUR OFFICE AND WE WERE RELYING 
3 ON THEM TO PREPARE THAT CASE AND TRY IT. 
4 Q THIS IS ABOUT HERE? 
5 A YES. AND I WAS AWARE THAT THE TRIAL DATE WAS 
6 COMING UP VERY SHORTLY AND THE DISCOVERY CUTOFF WAS SHORTLY 
7 AND SO I WAS INTERESTED, WOULD UNDERSTATE MY INVOLVEMENT 
8 IN IT. 
9 Q WELL, AS BEST AS YOU CAN, I KNOW IT'S BEEN A 
10 WHILE, CAN YOU TELL US WHAT YOU SAID AND WHAT HE SAID? 
11 A WELL, YEAH, I ASKED HIM WHY HE WAS WITHDRAWING. 
12 HE ANSWERED THAT HE HAD--THE CASE HAD FINANCIALLY GOT TOO 
13 BIG FOR HIM BECAUSE HE WAS OWED A HUGE AMOUNT OF FEES AND 
14 HE WASN'T GETTING PAID. 
15 Q NEITHER HOOD OR JAMES WERE PAYING HIM? 
16 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
17 Q WHAT ELSE WAS SAID? 
18 A AND THAT HE COULDN'T FINANCE THE CASE ANY LONGER 
19 SO HE DIDN'T HAVE ANY CHOICE BUT TO WITHDRAW. 
20 Q OKAY. AND THESE BARRED CHARTS, DURING THIS NEXT 
21 PERIOD OF TIME, REFER PRIMARILY TO THE DEFENSE THAT WAS 
22 DONE WHEN MR. BROWN WITHDREW? 
23 A CORRECT. 
24 Q DID THERE COME A TIME WHEN YOU TRIED TO NEGOTIATE; 
25 A RE-TENDER TO MR. BROWN? 
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1 A WHEN HE REVERSED THE TENDER, AND I CAN'T THINK 
2 OF, IN ALL MY EXPERIENCE, A TIME THAT'S EVER HAPPENED EXCEPT 
3 WHEN THE PRINCIPAL WAS GETTING READY TO FILE BANKRUPTCY, 
4 AND SO IT WAS PERPLEXING TO ME. SO WHEN HE REVERSED THE 
5 TENDER WE IMMEDIATELY PUT HOOD ON NOTICE THAT THE TENDER 
6 HAD BEEN REVERSED AND WE WERE UNDERTAKING THE DEFENSE OF 
7 THE CASE, WE WOULD BE, WE DEMANDED COLLATERAL FROM HOOD 
8 AND WE WOULD BE JOINING THEM IN THE ACTION IN ORDER TO GET 
9 A CONSISTENT RESULT. 
10 Q WAS YOUR UNDERSTANDING THAT INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY 
11 HAD ARRIVED AT A MAIN COLLATERAL? 
12 A YES. 
13 Q LET ME REFER YOU AGAIN TO EXHIBIT— 
14 JUDGE YOUNG: 5-P. 
15 THE WITNESS: 5-P. 
16 Q (BY MR. DANIELS) 5-P, THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT. 
17 AND CAN YOU KIND OF POINT OUT TO US WHERE YOU BELIEVE THAT 
18 INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY IS ENTITLED TO THE SECURITY? 
19 A I CAN IF YOU WILL POINT IT OUT TO ME. 
20 Q WELL, LOOK IN PARAGRAPH SECOND PERIOD, ON PAGE 
21 1 STARTING ON ABOUT LINE 21. 
22 A YES. IT SAYS, "THAT A SURETY SHALL SET UP A 
23 RESERVE TO COVER ANY CLAIM, SUIT OR JUDGMENT UNDER ANY SUCH 
24 BOND, THE INDEMNITORS WILL, IMMEDIATELY UPON DEMAND, DEPOSITJ 
25 WITH THE SURETY A SUM OF MONEY OR ACCEPTABLE SECURITY EQUAL 
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1 TO SUCH RESERVE, SUCH SUM TO BE HELD BY THE SURETY AS 
2 COLLATERAL SECURITY." 
3 Q SO YOU DEMANDED THAT HOOD CORPORATION AND MR., 
4 WAS IT LAULHERE, STILL ALIVE AT THAT TIME? 
5 A I BELIEVE SO. 
6 Q SO YOU DEMANDED THAT THEY SET UP SOME COLLATERAL 
7 OR SOME SECURITY? 
8 A YES. 
9 Q WHAT WAS THEIR RESPONSE? 
10 A THEIR RESPONSE WAS MARK LAULHERE ASKED TO MEET 
11 AND BROUGHT WITH HIM HIS INSURANCE AGENT AND WE MET AND 
12 WE BROUGHT TOGETHER ALL THE ATTORNEYS AT THE SAME TIME. 
13 Q NOW MARK LAULHERE IS THE OTHER—MR. LAULHERE'S 
14 SON. 
15 A YES, I THINK HE'S PROBABLY THE MAJOR OWNER NOW. 
16 HE IS THE SON OF THE THEN OWNER. AND HE WAS ACTIVE. AND 
17 MARK MAY HAVE BEEN PRESIDENT OF THE COMPANY AT THAT TIME. 
18 Q OKAY. SO HE'S NOT PERSONALLY THE INDEMNITOR 
19 AND HE'S STILL ALIVE. 
20 A YES. 
21 Q AND WHAT WAS THEIR RESPONSE ABOUT, IN THIS 
22 MEETING, ABOUT PUTTING UP SOME SECURITY ON YOUR PART ABOUT 
23 THE CONTRACT? 
24 A WELL, THEY OBJECTED TO BEING NAMED IN THE SUIT, 
25 OBJECTED TO THE DEMAND FOR COLLATERAL. AND IT WAS MY STRONG 
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1 RECOMMENDATION TO MY CLIENT THAT WE OBTAIN COLLATERAL IF 
2 THE COMPANY WAS AS STRONG AS IT SAID IT WAS, THEN IT WOULD 
3 BE NO PROBLEM FOR IT TO GIVE US A SECURITY INTEREST IN A 
4 PIECE OF PROPERTY. 
5 Q DID THEY PROVIDE YOU WITH SOME FINANCIALS AT 
6 THAT TIME? 
7 A YES. NOT AT THAT TIME BUT SHORTLY AFTER. 
8 Q OKAY. AND DID YOU REVIEW THOSE? 
9 A YES. 
10 Q WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING ABOUT ACCEPTING THEIR CREDITJ 
11 RATHER THAN HAVING THEM PUT UP COLLATERAL? 
12 A WELL, SEVERAL THINGS THAT, OF COURSE, WERE DIS-
13 TURBING. MY WIFE TELLS THE CHRISTMAS STORY ABOUT THE BARE 
14 CHRISTMAS AND IT LOOKS LIKE CHRISTMAS AND IT FEELS LIKE 
15 CHRISTMAS AND IT SMELLS LIKE CHRISTMAS, OR EVERYTHING, BUT 
16 IT DOESN'T FEEL LIKE CHRISTMAS. WELL, IN THIS CASE, THE 
17 FINANCIAL STATEMENT SUGGESTED LARGE ASSETS, BUT THE ACTIONS 
18 OF THE COMPANY IT DIDN'T LOOK LIKE IT AND IT DIDN'T ACT 
19 LIKE IT AND IT CERTAINLY DIDN'T FEEL LIKE THERE WERE ASSETS 
20 THERE. AND SO WE WERE VERY CONCERNED. 
21 AND THEN IN READING BOTH THE '85 AND THE '87 
22 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS I NOTED THAT OUR LETTERS CLAIMING THEY 
23 HAD A POTENTIAL EXPOSURE OF AROUND THREE MILLION DOLLARS 
2 4
 WASN'T EVEN IN THE AUDIT FINANCIAL STATEMENT. EITHER ONE. 
25 Q u DIDN'T REFER TO THAT STATEMENT OR TO THAT 
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1 CLAIM? 
2 A IT DID NOT. 
3 Q DID YOU FEEL THAT WAS KIND OF A SERIOUS OMISSION? 
4 A WELL--AND WE WERE MADE AWARE OF, ABOUT THE SAME 
5 TIME, THAT THEY WERE HAVING TROUBLE IN HAWAII AND WERE WITH-
6 DRAWING THEIR OPERATIONS FROM HAWAII. AND WE DIDN'T KNOW 
7 WHAT ELSE WAS MISSING FROM THAT STATEMENT. 
8 Q SO YOU FELT THAT INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY SHOULD 
9 STAND ON ITS CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO DEMAND COLLATERAL. 
10 A YEAH, IT WAS MY VERY STRONG RECOMMENDATION THAT 
11 WE DO IT. THE FEAR ALSO, BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE THAT WE 
12 HAD HAD FOR THREE FULL YEARS WAS THAT JAMES WAS GOING TO 
13 LOSE THE CASE AND HOOD WOULD STAY IN LOS ANGELES AND INDUS-
14 TRIAL INDEMNITY WOULD THEN HAVE TO PAY THE ENTIRE JUDGMENT 
15 AND THEN GO TO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA TO SUE HOOD AND BE IN 
16 COURT DOWN THERE FOR ANOTHER FIVE AND A HALF YEARS BEFORE 
17 IT GOT A TRIAL DATE. 
18 Q SO THAT'S WHY YOU WANTED THEM JOINED IN THIS 
19 LAWSUIT. 
20 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
21 Q AND YOU FILED WHAT, A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
22 AGAINST THEM OR SOMETHING? 
23 A YES. 
24 Q LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED EXHIBIT P-ll 
2 5
 AND ASK YOU IF THAT'S YOUR LETTER DEMANDING SECURITY. 
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1 I BELIEVE ONE WAS SET BUT I DIDN'T DO IT. MY UNDERSTANDING 
2 WAS THAT THERE WAS A RESERVE BUT I DIDN'T DO IT. 
3 Q WELL, TELL ME THE AMOUNT OF RESERVE. 
4 A WELL, I DON'T KNOW. 
5 Q THEN, BUT YOU KNOW, ABSOLUTELY, THERE WAS A 
6 RESERVE, IN FACT, SET UP ON THE RECORDS OF THAT COMPANY 
7 WHICH, IN TURN, WAS COMMUNICATED TO THE INSURANCE DEPARTMENTS, 
8 IN EVERY STATE WHERE IT DID BUSINESS. 
9 A WELL, YOUR SENTENCE ISN'T CORRECT FACTUALLY, 
10 BUT I BELIEVE A RESERVE WAS SET BUT IF A RESERVE WAS SET 
11 THERE'S NO NOTICE REQUIREMENT TO ANY STATE. 
12 Q ALL RIGHT. DID YOU REVIEW ACCOUNTING DOCUMENTS 
13 OF INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THEY 
14 HAD SETUP A RESERVE FOR THIS CLAIM BY SALT LAKE CITY? 
15 A I DID NOT BUT I WAS TOLD THAT A RESERVE WAS SET. 
16 Q ALL RIGHT. NOW MR. NORTON, HOOD CORPORATION 
17 WHO WAS AN INDEMNITOR, AND BARNEY LAULHERE WHO WAS THE 
18 INDEMNITOR, BOTH HAD SUBSTANTIAL NET WORTHS, DIDN'T THEY? 
19 A MR. LAULHERE DECLINED TO SUPPLY ANY FINANCIAL 
20 INFORMATION OF HIS PERSONALLY. 
21 Q WELL, LET'S DEAL WITH ONE QUESTION AT A TIME 
22 THEN. HOOD CORPORATION HAD SUBSTANTIAL NET WORTH DURING 
23 THE PERIOD OF TIME IN QUESTION, DIDN'T THEY? 
24 A THAT'S WHAT THE FINANCIAL STATEMENT SAID. 
25 Q WELL, DIDN'T YOU REVIEW THEIR FINANCIAL STATEMENT 
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AND OPINE TO INDUSTRIAL 
WORTH? 
IT I 
A 
3IDN 
INDEMNITY ABOUT THAT SUBSTANTIAL 
YEAH, I OPINED THAT AS A PART OF MY OPINION. 
'T LIST THIS CLAIM. AND THIS CLAIM WAS A VERY 
SUBSTANTIAL ONE. 
AND 
TO 
AND 
Q 
A 
YOU SAID THAT IN THE LETTER TO INDUSTRIAL? 
I TOLD INDUSTRIAL ORALLY ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONsJ 
IT MAY BE IN PRINT. 
Q I'D LIKE TO READ A PARAGRAPH FROM YOUR LETTER 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY 
ASK 
OPINION 
HIM THE 
ALREADY 
YOU IF THAT IS A 
WHICH IS DATED AUGUST 6TH, 1987 
CORRECT STATEMENT OF WHAT YOUR 
WAS ON AUGUST 6TH, 1987 REGARDING HOOD. 
MR. DANIELS: 
JUDGE YOUNG: 
LETTER, PLEASE. 
DEALT WITH? 
MAY I SEE THE LETTER, YOUR HONOR? 
YES, CERTAINLY. IF YOU WILL SHOW 
IS IT AN EXHIBIT NUMBER WE'VE 
MR. ANDERSON: NO, THIS IS A LETTER THEY PRODUCED 
TO ME THIS MORNING. 
MR. DANIELS: WELL, YOUR HONOR, I HAVE NO OBJEC-
TION TO HIM READING FROM IT. I THINK IT SHOULD BE MARKED 
AS AN EXHIBIT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AND THE COURT HAVE 
THE BENEFIT OF THE ENTIRE LETTER. 
MR. ANDERSON: I'LL DETERMINE HOW TO PROCEED 
WITH IT, IF I MIGHT. I'M JUST ASKING HIM ABOUT THIS STATE-
MENT MADE IN '87. 
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TO ASSIST 'EM IN THIS EFFORT AND THEY ALSO ENGAGE ATTORNEYS 
SUCH AS YOURSELF TO REVIEW THESE MATTERS AND ASSIST THEM 
IN MAKING SOME UNDERWRITING DECISIONS; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A OCCASIONALLY. 
Q OKAY. AND THEY ASK YOU TO REVIEW STATEMENTS, 
IN THIS INSTANCE ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS YOU REMEMBER; 
IS THAT CORRECT? 
A YES. ONCE A MATTER IS INTO CLAIM THEY'LL HAVE 
OUTSIDE ATTORNEYS ASSIST THEM. IN THE INITIAL UNDERWRITING 
THEY DON'T USE OUTSIDE ATTORNEYS OR OUTSIDE ACCOUNTANTS. 
Q ALL RIGHT. NOW IN CONNECTION WITH LOOKING AT 
THE FINANCIAL WORTH OF HOOD AND SOLVENCY, AND THOSE OTHER 
MATTERS, THERE ARE VARIOUS TIME ENTRIES IN THEIR TIMESHEETS 
ABOUT DISCUSSIONS WITH SOMEBODY BY THE NAME OF JONES, I 
THINK, AT THE C.P.A. FIRM OF JONES S MARZLUFT. 
A YES. 
Q AND DID YOU MEET WITH THEM PERSONALLY TO REVIEW 
THE HOOD FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AT ANY TIME? 
A I BELIEVE I DID. 
Q AND MEET WITH 'EM IN SALT LAKE CITY? 
A I BELIEVE THAT KAY JONES MAY HAVE ATTENDED THE 
MEETING IN SEPTEMBER OF 1987 WHEN MR. LAULHERE WAS HERE, 
BUT I'M NOT POSITIVE. 
Q ALL RIGHT. AND DID MR. JONES INDICATE TO YOU 
THAT HE HAD ANY REASON TO DOUBT THE NET WORTH AS SHOWN ON 
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1 THE ERNST & WHINNEY STATEMENT FOR HOOD AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES? 
2 A MR. JONES, AND I DISCOVERED, OR MR. JONES AND 
3 I DISCUSSED— 
4 Q MR. NORTON, IF I MIGHT? I MEAN, WE CAN SPEED 
5 THIS UP. I ASKED YOU--
6 A YES. 
7 Q — I ASKED YOU A VERY PRECISE QUESTION AND IF 
8 YOU WOULD — 
9 A WOULD YOU REPEAT IT? 
10 Q DID MR. JONES INDICATE TO YOU ON THE OCCASION 
11 OF THAT MEETING THAT HE HAD ANY REASON TO DOUBT THE FINANCIAL) 
12 STATEMENT OF HOOD AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES AS PREPARED BY ERNST 
13 & WHINNEY, ONE OF THE BIG EIGHT ACCOUNTING FIRMS? 
14 A YES. 
15 Q WHAT DID HE SAY ABOUT IT? 
16 A HE SAID THAT HE HAD DOUBTS ABOUT IT BECAUSE IT 
17 DIDN'T LIST A CLAIM THAT COULD MEET OR EXCEED $3,000,000.00 
18 Q WAS THERE ANYTHING SHOWN IN CONTINGENT 
19 LIABILITIES? 
20 A NO. THERE WAS A REFERENCE THAT THERE MAY BE 
21 CONTINGENT LIABILITIES BUT THERE WAS NO REFERENCE OF THIS 
22 CLAIM. 
23 Q WELL, IN THE COURSE OF ACCOUNTING STATEMENTS 
24 YOU'RE ASKED TO OPINE TO CLIENTS ABOUT WHAT THE POSSIBLE 
25 CONTINGENT LIABILITY IS, AND THERE'S CERTAIN GUIDELINES 
00Q0-" 
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WHICH ATTORNEYS AND ACCOUNTANTS FOLLOW IN PREPARING AUDIT 
LETTERS. IS THAT A CORRECT STATEMENT? 
A YES. 
Q DID YOU EVER PREPARE AN AUDIT LETTER STATEMENT 
TO INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY TELLING INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY THAT 
THERE WAS A $3,000,000.00 LOSS HERE? 
A I WAS NEVER ASKED TO DO THAT, NOT AS A PART OF 
AN AUDIT LETTER. 
Q YOU WERE NEVER REQUESTED BY INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY 
TO ASSESS THE POSSIBLE LOSS? 
A OH, NO, I WAS REQUESTED TO ASSESS THIS LOSS. 
Q WHAT DID YOU ASSESS THIS LOSS TO BE? 
A I ASSESSED THAT THE CHANCES WERE VERY GOOD THAT 
JAMES WOULD LOSE THE CASE ENTIRELY. 
Q OKAY. AND WHAT DID YOU ASSESS THE LOSS TO BE? 
A WELL, THE LOSS WOULD BE, AT THE OUTSIDE, WOULD 
BE THE COST OF REDOING THE JOB WHICH EXCEEDED $2,00 0,0 00.00 
PLUS INTEREST. 
Q MR. NORTON, YOUR COMPANY HAD A BOND FOR 
$1,128,000.00, CORRECT? 
A YES. 
Q AND THAT WAS YOUR EXPOSURE WAS $1,128,000.00. 
A PLUS INTEREST. 
Q OKAY. BUT WASN'T THAT THE EXTENT OF THE EXPOSUREj 
SET FORTH IN THAT BOND? 
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1 Q I UNDERSTAND, BUT YOU HAD AN AGREEMENT, WHICH, 
2 IN EFFECT, WAS A CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT BY HOOD AND LAULHERE 
3 IF JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED BY SALT LAKE CITY AGAINST INDUSTRIAL 
4 INDEMNITY. IS THAT A CORRECT STATEMENT? 
5 A THAT'S RIGHT. 
6 Q THAT'S UNDER PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE STIPULATION. 
7 AND YOU ALSO HAD A FINANCIAL STATEMENT SHOWING A NET WORTH 
8 OF HOOD CORPORATION OF SOME 2<+ TO $26,000,000.00 AT THE 
9 TIME; IS THAT CORRECT? 
10 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
11 Q WHAT WAS THE NET WORTH OF MR. LAULHERE? 
12 A THEY DID NOT SUPPLY US THAT INFORMATION. 
13 Q DID YOU EVER KNOW WHAT THAT NET WORTH WAS? 
14 A NO. 
15 Q DO YOU KNOW IF THAT INFORMATION WAS SUPPLIED 
16 BY THE ACCOUNTANTS FOR INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY? 
17 A MY BEST UNDERSTANDING IS THAT IT WAS NOT. AND 
18 I SAW A TIME ENTRY ON THAT ISSUE. 
19 Q IN FACT, YOU AGREED IN THE STIPULATION YOU WOULD 
20 NOT REQUIRE COLLATERAL UNLESS THERE WAS SOME EVENT WHERE 
21 THEIR NET WORTH WAS DIMINISHED BY 20 PERCENT LESS THAN 
22 | WHAT IT WAS SHOWN IN 1987; ISN'T THAT CORRECT? 
23 I A MM-HMM. (YES). AND THAT WAS THE POINT OF THE 
24 STIPULATION WAS TO RESOLVE THE COLLATERAL ISSUE. 
25 Q OKAY. SO YOU WAIVED YOUR EARLIER DISCUSSIONS 
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1 Q AND DID YOU EVER ATTEND MEETINGS DURING THAT 
2 PERIOD OF TIME? 
3 A I'M SURE I DIDN'T ATTEND ALL THE MEETINGS. 
4 MR. ANDERSON: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
5 JUDGE YOUNG: ANYTHING FURTHER OF THIS WITNESS? 
6 MR. DANIELS: JUST A COUPLE, YOUR HONOR. 
7 JUDGE YOUNG: YES. 
8 
9 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
10 BY MR. DANIELS: 
11 Q THE TESTIMONY, MR. NORTON, THAT THROUGHOUT, OR 
12 AT LEAST DURING MOST OF THE TIME THAT THIS LAWSUIT WAS 
13 PENDING, YOU WERE AWARE THAT HOOD CORPORATION HAD A STRONG 
14 FINANCIAL POSITION. IS THAT YOUR TESTIMONY? 
15 A THAT WAS THE REPRESENTAIONS MADE TO US. 
16 Q YEAH. YOU WERE AT LEAST AWARE THEIR FINANCIAL 
17 STATEMENTS PROVIDED TO YOU SHOWED A STRONG FINANCIAL 
18 POSITION. 
19 A YES. 
20 Q DID YOU HAVE EXPERIENCES WHEN CORPORATIONS WHICH 
21 HAD A STRONG FINANCIAL POSITION LATER WERE UNABLE TO RESPOND 
22 TO CLAIMS FOR INDEMNITY? 
23 A MANY, MANY, MANY EXPERIENCES OF THAT. 
24 Q AND IS IT ALWAYS TRUE THAT A STRONG FINANCIAL 
25 POSITION IS AN INDICATION THAT THE INDEMNITOR IS GOING TO 
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BE EASY TO COLLECT OR IS GOING TO BE COLLECTIBLE EVEN THOUGH 
IT MAY HAVE A STRONG FINANCIAL— 
A NO. 
MR. ANDERSON: OBJECTION. CALLS FOR SPECULATION 
AND CONJECTURE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: IT CALLS FOR SPECULATION. THE 
ANSWER IS STRICKEN. 
Q (BY MR. DANIELS) ALL RIGHT. DURING THE COURSE 
OF THIS DID YOU HAVE CONSIDERATIONS, STRATEGICAL DECISIONS 
TO MAKE REGARDING HOOD CORPORATION WHETHER YOU SHOULD TENDER 
THE DEFENSE OR WHETHER YOU SHOULD STAY OUT BASED ON ALL 
THOSE THINGS? 
A YES. 
Q AND DID YOU TRY TO MAKE THOSE DECISIONS IN GOOD 
FAITH AND BASED UPON WHAT YOU FELT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE 
CASE? 
A YES. 
Q DID YOU DO ANYTHING TO RUN UP THE BILL THINKING 
THEY WILL HAVE TO PAY IT EVENTUALLY, SO WHAT? 
A NOT AT ALL. 
Q AND IN YOUR OPINION WAS EVERYTHING THAT WAS DONE 
NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY? 
A WE TRIED OUR BEST TO DO THAT, YES. 
Q LET ME ASK YOU, I JUST WANT TO STRAIGHTEN SOME-
THING OUT IN TERMS OF TIMEFRAME HERE. MR. ANDERSON ASKED 
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1 A AS I RECALL, WHEN MR. NORTON FIRST CAME TO ME 
2 HE GAVE ME THE FILES, AT LEAST THE CRITICAL FILES, AND ASKED 
3 ME TO REVIEW THEM AND TO BECOME FAMILIAR WITH THE FACTS. 
4 WE DISCUSSED--AFTER I DID THAT WE DISCUSSED WHAT I THOUGHT 
5 TO BE THE EXPOSURE OF INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY AND PRINCIPAL, 
6 JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, AND INDEMNITORS. I HAD REVIEWED ALL 
7 OF THOSE AGREEMENTS AND THE PLEADINGS IN THE CASE AND AFTER 
8 DOING SO I AGREED WITH MR. NORTON THAT THAT WAS A VERY 
9 DANGEROUS CASE. I TOLD HIM THAT I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE FOOL-
10 HEARTY TO GO TO TRIAL AND IT NEEDED TO BE SETTLED. 
11 Q DID YOU EVER TELL ANYBODY FROM HOOD OR JAMES 
12 THAT? 
13 A ABSOLUTELY. 
14 Q HOW ABOUT—TELL US ABOUT THAT. 
15 A CONTINUOUSLY. WE FIRST, AT THE VERY OUTSET OF 
16 MY INVOLVEMENT, WITHIN A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME HAD THIS 
17 MEETING THAT MR. NORTON TESTIFIED ABOUT WITH THE PEOPLE 
18 FROM HOOD AND FROM JAMES CONSTRUCTORS AND THE LAWYERS REPRE-
19 SENTING THE VARIOUS PARTIES AT OUR CONFERENCE ROOM HERE 
20 IN SALT LAKE CITY. AT THAT MEETING, I DON'T REMEMBER EVERY-
21 THING THAT WAS SAID, IT WAS A FAIRLY LENGTHY MEETING, BUT 
22 AS I RECOLLECT, MR. NORTON EMPHASIZED TO EVERYONE PRESENT 
23 THAT WE THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS A VERY DANGEROUS CASE WITH 
24 A LOT OF EXPOSURE AND THAT THERE WERE SUBSTANTIAL RISKS 
25 INVOLVED IN PROCEEDING WITH LITIGATION. 
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1 Q DO YOU RECALL WHAT THE SETTLEMENT POSTURE WAS 
2 AT THE TIME? WHAT THE CASE COULD HAVE BEEN SETTLED FOR 
3 BACK THEN. 
4 A WELL, I NEVER REALLY GOT INTO NUMBERS UNTIL AFTER 
5 THAT MEETING. AND AS IT TURNED OUT, AS MR. BEESLEY STARTED 
6 TO BECOME MORE ACTIVE IN THE LITIGATION OF THE CASE--HE 
7 AND I KNEW EACH OTHER FROM PRIOR CASES AND I VIEWED HIM 
8 AS A VERY COMPETENT LAWYER AND ONE THAT I HAD A LOT OF CONFIj 
9 DENCE IN IN TERMS OF HOW HE WOULD PRESENT HIS CASE AND REPREj 
10 SENT HIS CLIENT. AND AFTER LITIGATION BEGAN I STARTED TO 
11 TALK TO HIM ABOUT WHAT IT WOULD TAKE TO SETTLE THE CASE. 
12 WHILE WE NEVER REALLY AGREED ON NUMBERS IN ANY FINAL SENSE 
13 IT'S MY RECOLLECTION THAT EARLY ON IN THE LITIGATION IT 
14 WAS SUGGESTED TO ME BY MR. BEESLEY THAT THE CASE COULD SETTLf 
15 FOR APPROXIMATLEY A HALF A MILLION DOLLARS. THAT FIGURE 
16 RAPIDLY WENT UP AFTER THAT. BUT AT THAT POINT THAT'S MY 
17 RECOLLECTION IS THAT WE COULD PROBABLY HAVE SETTLED THE 
18 CASE FOR HALF A MILLION DOLLARS SHORTLY AFTER I BECAME 
19 INVOLVED. 
20 Q DID YOU MAKE ANY EFFORTS TO TRY TO GET HOOD'S 
21 ATTENTION TO GET THIS CASE SETTLED? 
22 A I DID. I HAD VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE 
23 VARIOUS LAWYERS REPRESENTING HOOD AND JAMES. I EXPRESSED 
24 TO THEM MY VIEW THAT THIS CASE HAD TO BE SETTLED, I EXPRESSEjD 
2 5
 MY VIEW THAT WE WERE HEMORRHAGING, NOT ONLY IN TERMS OF 
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10 
1 ULTIMATE EXPOSURE FOR DAMAGES BUT ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE 
2 MOUNTING AND THE LONGER WE STAYED IN THE CASE THE HIGHER 
3 THOSE COSTS WOULD BE, AND THAT IF THE CASE WERE GOING TO 
4
 SETTLE IT OUGHT TO SETTLE EARLY TO AVOID ACCUMULATION OF 
5 THOSE KINDS OF EXPENSES AND COSTS. I KNOW THAT MR. POWELL, 
6
 I SEE SITTING HERE, AND I HAD A NUMBER OF CONVERSATIONS 
7 ABOUT THE WISDOM OF SETTLEMENT. MR. BEESLEY, I HAD THE 
8
 FEELING, LOOKED AT ME MORE AS AN INTERMEDIARY AS MUCH AS 
9 I ANYTHING IN THOSE SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS. HE USED TO CALL 
ME ON A REGULAR BASIS AND TRY TO CONVINCE ME TO PUT PRESSURE 
11
 ON HOOD OR JAMES TO GET THE CASE SETTLED AND HE, TOWARD 
12
 THE END OF THOSE SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS, TRIED TO CONVINCE 
13
 ME TO HAVE INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY JUST PAY SEPARATELY BECAUSE 
14
 WE COULD NEVER GET HOOD TO COMMIT ON ANY NUMBER OR ANYTHING. 
15
 WE COULD NEVER EVEN GET A NUMBER TO PRESENT BACK TO MR. 
16
 BEESLEY FROM HOOD. AND I WOULD MAKE THE ARGUMENTS, YOU'RE 
17
 I GOING TO HAVE TO PAY IT ANYWAY IN THE END, YOU KNOW, THIS 
IS THE TIME TO DO IT, BUT WE COULD NEVER, I COULD NEVER 
GET THEM TO GIVE US A NUMBER. 
AND WITH RESPECT TO MR. BEESLEY'S REQUEST THAT 
WE PAY, THAT INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY PAY SEPARATELY, I TOLD 
22
 I HIM THAT WE WERE REALLY IN A CONFLICT SITUATION HERE BECAUSE 
2 3
 IT WAS RISKY FOR INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY TO DO ANYTHING THAT 
2 4
 I MIGHT BE INCONSISTENT WITH OR UNDERCUT DEFENSES THAT JAMES 
WANTED TO ASSERT. AND IF WE WENT AHEAD AND PAID MONEY AT 
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MR. BEESLEY'S REQUEST, CONTRARY TO, OR WITHOUT PERMISSION 
OF HOOD AND JAMES, WE WERE VERY CONCERNED THAT WE WOULD 
BE IN FURTHER LITIGATION WITH THEM OVER THE REASONABLENESS 
OF ANY SETTLEMENT OR POSSIBLY AN ALLEGATION THAT WE HAD 
DONE SOMETHING TO UNDERCUT THEIR DEFENSES. 
AND SO WE WERE REALLY BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD 
PLACE HERE BECAUSE WE WANTED TO BE SUPPORTIVE OF THE PRINCI-
PAL IN WHAT THEY WERE TRYING TO PRESENT BY WAY OF DEFENSE 
AND YET I WAS STRONGLY OF THE OPINION THAT THIS CASE SHOULD 
NOT CONTINUE ON WITH LITIGATION. 
Q NOW, WERE YOU TRYING TO COOPERATE WITH MR. POWELL 
IN PRESENTING THE DEFENSES? 
A YES. MR. POWELL IS A VERY COMPETENT LAWYER. 
I HAVE A LOT OF FAITH IN WHAT HE DOES. I HAVE BEEN IN OTHER 
CASES WITH HIM WHERE HE HAS VERY SKILLFULLY REPRESENTED 
HIS CLIENTS. HE SEEMED TO HAVE A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF 
THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THIS CASE, THE ENGINEERING PRINCI-
PALS INVOLVED. AND MR. POWELL AND I USED TO COMMUNICATE 
ON A REGULAR BASIS DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME I WAS INVOLVED. 
KEEP IN MIND, I WAS INVOLVED QUITE EXTENSIVELY FROM THE TIME 
OF THIS MEETING, OR A LITTLE BEFORE THIS MEETING, THAT I--
Q ABOUT WHEN WAS THAT AGAIN? 
A IN THE LATE SUMMER, EARLY FALL OF 1987. RIGHT 
BEFORE THE--
Q RIGHT IN THAT AREA WHERE THE BILLINGS GO UP? 
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1 IN AGREEMENT THAT THIS CASE HAD TO BE SETTLED OR SHOULD 
2 HAVE BEEN SETTLED. AND IT WAS ALSO MY UNDERSTANDING, AND 
3 HE CAN CORRECT ME IF I'M WRONG, AGAIN, BUT I DON'T THINK 
4 HE WAS EVER ABLE TO CONVINCE HOOD TO CONTRIBUTE ANYTHING. 
5 OF COURSE, HE WAS REPRESENTING CIGNA AND CIGNA WAS OF THE 
6 OPINION THAT THEY DIDN'T REALLY OWE ANYTHING. AND I TENDED 
7 TO AGREE WITH HIM THERE. 
8 Q WELL, HE WAS REPRESENTING—HIS CLIENT WAS JAMES, 
9 I GUESS. 
10 A YES, BUT ONLY FOR THE CIGNA POLICY. I SAID THAT 
11 BADLY, BUT THE CIGNA POLICY WAS LIMITED TO A VERY SMALL 
12 PORTION OF THE TOTAL CLAIM MADE BY THE CITY AND SO CIGNA, 
13 AS I UNDERSTAND IT, WAS NOT WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE VERY MUCH, 
14 IF ANYTHING, TOWARDS TOTAL SETTLEMENT. AND WE COULD NEVER 
15 INTEREST HOOD, WHICH WAS THE ONLY OTHER PARTY THAT HAD ANY 
16 MONEY, BESIDES US, INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY, TO CONTRIBUTE ANY-
17 THING. AND SO WE NEVER--THE SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS JUST 
18 NEVER WENT ANYWHERE BESIDES CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN ME AND 
19 MR. POWELL AND ME AND MR. BEESLEY. AND WE COULD JUST NEVER 
20 GET ANY NUMBERS. 
21 Q DID ANYBODY EVER SUGGEST TO YOU THAT YOU WERE 
22 PUTTING IN TOO MUCH TIME OR THAT YOU SHOULD BACK OFF OR 
23 THAT YOU'RE TOO HIGH OF A PROFILE, YOU'RE GOING TO TOO MANY 
24 DEPOSITIONS, YOU'RE RUNNING UP UNNECESSARY FEES? 
25 A NO. ABSOLUTELY NOT. AS A MATTER OF FACT, I 
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1 MR. DANIELS: THANK YOU. 
2 Q (BY MR. DANIELS) NOW MR. SLAUGHTER, I MAINLY 
3 WANT TO GO OVER WITH YOU THIS THIRD PART OF THE BAR CHART 
4 BECAUSE WE PRETTY WELL COVERED THE FIRST BAR WITH MR. NORTON, 
5 I BELIEVE. YOU WERE INVOLVED IN THIS FILE FROM ALMOST THE 
6 BEGINNING, WEREN'T YOU? 
7 A I WAS INVOLVED PRIMARILY FROM ABOUT OCTOBER, 
8 AUGUST, LATE SUMMER, EARLY FALL OF 1987. AS I RECALL, MY 
9 PRINCIPAL INVOLVEMENT AT THAT TIME WAS AN ADVANCE OF A SCHE-
10 DULED PRE-TRIAL TO SET ASIDE THE SCHEDULING ORDER THAT 
11 EXISTED, I THINK, AT THAT TIME, BEFORE JUDGE BILLINGS, AND 
12 I MAY HAVE HAD--IF I'M WRONG ON THE CALENDAR I'M WRONG, 
13 BUT THERE WAS SOME EFFORTS TO HAVE THE TRIAL DATE SET ASIDE. 
14 AND THEN IN APPROXIMATELY OCTOBER OF 1987 I PREPARED AN 
15 AMENDED ANSWER ON BEHALF OF INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY 
16 AND EVENTUALLY A CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST HOOD AND THIRD-PARTY 
17 COMPLAINT AGAINST MR. LAULHERE. AND THAT IS THE INITIAL 
18 PART OF MY INVOLVEMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN LATE SUMMER, 
19 EARLY FALL OF 1987. 
20 Q I WANT TO TAKE YOU OVER HERE TO LATE '89. IT 
21 LOOKS LIKE NOT MUCH WENT ON FOR QUITE SOME TIME AND THEN 
22 IN, IT LOOKS LIKE OCTOBER OF '89, SNOW, CHRISTENSEN S 
23 MARTINEAU BILLED ABOUT TEN HOURS. 
24 A IT LOOKS LIKE OCTOBER OF '90. 
25 Q OKAY. YEAH, YOU'RE RIGHT. CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT 
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WAS HAPPENING THAT STARTED THIS, YOU KNOW, THIS TREND? 
A WELL, THE TREND ACTUALLY BEGAN, I GUESS, WITH 
THE APPEALS PROCESS. JAMES CONSTRUCTORS HAD HAD A COUNTER-
CLAIM OR, ACTUALLY, A SEPARATE ACTION AND COMPLAINT AGAINST 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION THAT WAS CONSOLIDATED WITH THE 
GREATER SALT LAKE CITY ACTION. 
Q LET ME FOCUS YOU A LITTLE MORE. IN OCTOBER OF 
'90 WAS THERE A MEETING HELD AT THE ALTA CLUB? 
A THERE WAS IN OCTOBER, I THINK IT WAS OCTOBER 
23RD AT 7:30, WHICH IS GENERALLY A LITTLE BIT EARLIER THAN 
I COME INTO THE OFFICE. MR. BOB ANDERSON SUGGESTED THAT 
THE DEFENSE COUNSEL INVOLVED IN THAT MEET AT BREAKFAST AT 
THE ALTA CLUB. 
Q WHO WAS PRESENT? 
A TO MY RECOLLECTION MR. ANDERSON WAS THERE, ELWOOD 
POWELL WAS THERE, JAY JENSEN AND MYSELF. 
Q WHAT WAS DISCUSSED? 
A THERE WAS A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF PHILOSOPHIES 
AND STRATEGY CONCERNING DEFENSE OF THE ACTION, POST-APPEAL, 
WHO OUGHT TO BE DOING WHAT, WHAT POSITIONS OUGHT TO BE TAKEN 
MY RECOLLECTION IS THAT MR. ANDERSON HAD RECENTLY 
BECOME INVOLVED IN THE CASE AND I THINK THAT THERE WAS SOME 
GENERAL, IF I REMEMBER CORRECTLY, SOME GENERAL ANALYSIS 
OF THE POSITION OF THE CASE AT THAT TIME AND TO WHAT, IF 
ANY, OF THE DEFENSES THAT HAD BEEN RAISED BY JAMES AND BY 
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1 INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY HAD SURVIVED THE COURT'S EARLIER ORDERS 
2 THERE WAS A DISCUSSION OF WHAT MOTIONS OUGHT 
3 TO BE MADE, WHETHER THERE OUGHT TO BE SOME ATTEMPT TO REFINE 
4 A PRE-TRIAL ORDER. AND IF MY RECOLLECTION SERVES ME 
5 CORRECTLY, MR. BEESLEY HAD OFFERED A PRE-TRIAL ORDER AT 
6 ABOUT THAT SAME TIME THAT HAD DRAMATICALLY REDUCED A NUMBER 
7 OF THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND SIMILAR CLAIMS THAT HAD 
8 BEEN ASSERTED BY THE DEFENDANTS IN THE ACTION. IT WAS AN 
9 EFFORT TO REFINE THAT, TO SEE IF, IN FACT, THERE WAS A BASIS 
10 FOR THAT, IF WE OUGHT TO MAKE A FINAL PUSH TO RESURRECT 
11 SOME OF THOSE CLAIMS. 
12 Q WAS THE DECISION MADE TO MAKE A FINAL PUSH TO 
13 RESURRENT THOSE CLAIMS? 
14 A IT WAS. 
15 Q WHO SUGGESTED THAT; DO YOU REMEMBER? 
16 A I DON'T REMEMBER SPECIFICALLY. I KNOW THERE 
17 WAS SOME DISCUSSION AS TO WHETHER INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY OUGHT 
18 TO BE THE ONE TO DO THAT. AND THE CONSENSUS AMONG THOSE 
19 PRESENT WAS THAT INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY WAS IN THE BEST 
20 POSITION TO DO THAT AND PROBALBY OUGHT TO TAKE THAT LEAD. 
21 Q WHAT WERE THOSE CLAIMS? 
! 
22 A THE CLAIMS WERE PRIMARILY RELATED TO AFFIRMATIVE | 
23 DEFENSES THAT INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY HAD MADE ARISING FROM 
24 NEGLIGENT INSPECTION. THAT WAS THE PRIMARY ONE. AS MR. 
25 NORTON INDICATED THERE WERE THREE PRIMARY DEFENSES THAT 
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1 INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY HAD ASSERTED EARLY ON IN THE LITIGATION, 
2 A FAILURE OF TIMELY NOTICE BY SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION--
3 JUDGE YOUNG: SLOW DOWN, MR. SLAUGHTER. 
4 THE WITNESS: I'M EXCITED, YOUR HONOR. NOTICE 
5 WAS ONE ISSUE, OVERPAYMENT WAS ANOTHER ISSUE. 
6 Q (BY MR. DANIELS) WAS THERE ANY DECISION MADE 
7 ABOUT THE OVERPAYMENT ISSUE? 
8 A MY RECOLLECTION IS THAT THERE WAS A DECISION 
9 MADE, WHETHER IN CONNECTION WITH THAT MEETING OR LATER, 
10 I DON'T RECALL, BUT--
11 Q LET ME SEE IF I UNDERSTAND THE OVERPAYMENT ISSUE. 
12 WAS THE CLAIM THAT SALT LAKE CITY HAD PAID JAMES TOO MUCH? 
13 A THERE'S A DEFENSE AVAILABLE TO SURETIES THAT 
14 IF THE OBLIGEE, IN THIS CASE SALT LAKE CITY, PAYS TOO MUCH 
15 TO THE CONTRACTOR, BASED ON THE PROGRESS OF THE WORK IN 
16 PLACE AT THE TIME THAT THE SURETY MAY BE DISCHARGED PRO 
17 TANTO TO THE EXTENT OF THAT OVERPAYMENT. 
18 Q OKAY. SO THE CLAIM THAT THE SURETY HAD WAS THAT 
19 SALT LAKE HAD PAID TOO MUCH, BUT JAMES WAS TAKING THE 
20 POSITION SALT LAKE HADN'T PAID ENOUGH. 
21 A YEAH. JAMES HAD TAKEN THE POSITION THEY HAD 
22 NOT RECEIVED ADEQUATE PAYMENT UNDER THE CONTRACT. AND THEY 
23 WEREN'T VERY EXCITED ABOUT INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY PRESSING 
24 THAT PARTICULAR POINT, NOT ONLY THROUGH DISCOVERY BUT IN 
25 THIS FINAL EFFORT TO REFINE THOSE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES. 
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 Q I UNDERSTAND. SO WHAT DECISION WAS MADE ABOUT 
2 THAT? 
3
 A EITHER IN CONNECTION WITH THAT MEETING OR LATER 
4 THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT THAT INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY WOULD NOT 
5 PRESS THE ISSUE OF OVERPAYMENT, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT 
6 WE COULD BRING IT IN AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE 
7 DEFENSE RELATED TO NEGLIGENT INSPECTION. 
8 Q TELL ME ABOUT THAT. NOW THAT, I TAKE IT, IS 
9 A CLAIM THAT SALT LAKE DIDN'T INSPECT THE WORK WELL ENOUGH 
10 AND SHOULD HAVE CAUGHT THE FACT THAT IT WASN'T BEING DONE 
11 RIGHT. IS THAT ESSENTIALLY WHAT IT IS? 
12 A THAT'S THE POSITION THAT JAMES HAD TAKEN IN AN 
13 EARLIER AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH, MY RECOLLECTION, HAD 
14 BEEN STRICKEN, AND INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY HAD MADE AN EFFORT 
15 ON A PRIOR OCCASION AND AGAIN IN LATE 1990 TO DISTINGUISH 
16 ITS POSITION AS SURETY FROM THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE CON-
17 TRACTOR. 
18 Q I DON'T MEAN TO INTERRUPT YOU BUT YOU'RE TELLING 
19 US QUITE A BIT MORE THAN WE WANT TO KNOW. WE WANT TO GET 
20 THROUGH THIS QUICKLY, IF POSSIBLE. IS IT RIGHT TO SAY THAT 
21 THE DEFENSE HAD ALREADY BEEN THROWN OUT BY THE JUDGE AS 
22 TO JAMES? 
23 A THAT'S RIGHT. 
24 Q AND THE DECISION AT THAT MEETING IN THE ALTA 
25 CLUB WAS THAT MAYBE THE SURETY OUGHT TO ASSERT THAT INDEPEN-
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1 DENTLY. 
2 A IT HAD BEEN A DEFENSE ALL ALONG AND WE WANTED 
3 TO MAKE A FINAL PUSH TO DRAW THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE 
4 SURETY AND THE PRINCIPAL. 
5 Q OKAY. AND YOU SAY "WE." WAS EVERYONE AT THAT 
6 MEETING PRETTY WELL AGREED THAT'S WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 
7 A YES. 
8 Q AND THAT SHOULD BE DONE BY THE SURETY? 
9 A THAT'S RIGHT. 
10 Q SO DO THESE NEXT TWO BIG BAR GRAPH LINES THAT 
11 I SEE RELATE TO PUSHING THAT MOTION IN SOME WAY? 
12 A TO THAT AND OTHER PRE-TRIAL MATTERS THAT WERE 
13 ALSO PENDING AT THE TIME. 
14 Q I GUESS THE TRIAL WASKIND OF HEATING UP. WE'RE 
15 GETTING READY FOR TRIAL AT THIS POINT? 
16 A THAT'S RIGHT. 
17 Q so THERE IS TRIAL PREPARATION AND THEN INDEPENDENT 
18 DEFENSES, RIGHT? 
19 A RIGHT. 
20 Q OKAY. NOW, I WANTED TO ASK YOU. YOU SAY YOU 
21 GOT INVOLVED SOME TIME IN THIS AREA, THE '80, '78 AREA AT 
22 THE BEGINNING. 
23 A RIGHT. 
24 Q THEN SHORTLY AFTER THAT THE STIPULATION WAS 
25 SIGNED. 
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1 A IN APRIL OF 1988. 
2 Q OKAY. AND THEN DO YOU RECALL ANY TIME IN BETWEEN 
3 THE PERIODS OF TIME THAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT DID ANYONE 
4 SUGGEST TO YOU THAT INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY OUGHT TO TENDER 
5 THE DEFENSE BACK TO JAMES, THAT JAMES SHOULD TAKE IT OVER, 
6 THAT SNOW, CHRISTENSEN S MARTINEAU SHOULD GET OUT OF THE 
7 CASE, THAT SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU WAS SPENDING TOO 
8 MUCH TIME? ANYTHING LIKE THAT? 
9 A NO. 
10 Q WAS NEVER ANY DISCUSSION BY ANYBODY? 
11 A NO. 
12 Q DID THERE COME A TIME WHEN MR. ANDERSON MADE 
13 THAT KIND OF A SUGGESTION THAT SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
14 OUGHT TO GET OUT AND TENDER THE DEFENSE? 
15 A YES. AFTER THE MOTIONS THAT WE'VE DISCUSSED 
16 WERE REJECTED BY THE COURT AND THERE WAS A DISCUSSION TO 
17 THAT EFFECT. 
18 Q SO YOU WENT BACK AND ARGUED THESE MOTIONS ON 
19 THE NEGLIGENT INSPECTION DEFENSE AND I TAKE IT YOU LOST. 
20 A RIGHT. 
21 Q AND SO AFTER THAT--LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN 
22 MARKED EXHIBIT 19. HOW DID THAT--FIRST OF ALL, WHEN DID 
23 THAT CONVERSATION TAKE PLACE? 
24 A BASED ON MY MEMO, WHICH I PREPARED THE SAME DAY, 
25 MAY 17 OF 1 9 9 1 . 
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Q SO THAT'S--WE'RE TALKING AFTER THESE MOTIONS 
HAVE BEEN ARGUED AND WHILE PRE-TRIAL IS STILL HEATING UP 
A LITTLE BIT. 
A RIGHT. 
Q HOW DID YOU HAPPEN TO TALK TO MR. ANDERSON? 
A I WAS ON THE WAY TO THE BANK AT VALLEY BANK AND 
I RAN INTO HIM OUTSIDE THE VALLEY TOWERS WHERE HIS OFFICE 
WAS, I BELIEVE, AT THE TIME. 
Q WAS ANYONE PRESENT BESIDES YOU AND MR. ANDERSON? 
A SEVERAL PEOPLE WALKED BY BUT WE WERE THE ONLY 
PARTIES TO THE CONVERSATION. 
Q TELL ME ABOUT THE CONVERSATION. WHAT DID YOU 
SAY AND WHAT DID HE SAY? 
A MAY I RELY ON MY MEMORY? 
Q CERTAINLY. 
A I HAPPENED TO ASK BOB--WE WERE CONTINUALLY INTER-
ESTED IN THE STATUS OF SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS AND POTENTIAL 
RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN JAMES/HOOD AND SALT LAKE 
CITY, AND I OPENED THE CONVERSATION WITH MR. ANDERSON BY 
ASKING HIM WHAT THE STATUS OF THAT WAS, IF HE SAW ANY BREAKS 
IN THE IMPASSE. HE INDICATED HE DIDN'T. AND IT WAS AT 
THAT TIME MR. ANDERSON SAID THAT WE PROBABLY OUGHT TO CONSI-
DER, I'M NOT EVEN SURE HE DISCUSSED IT WITH HIS OWN CLIENT, 
AND I CERTAINLY HAD NOT WITH INDUSTRIAL, BUT WE OUGHT TO 
CONSIDER, GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE CASE AS IT EXISTED AS 
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OF MAY OF 1991, WHETHER IT MIGHT BE BENEFICIAL, ULTIMATELY, 
TO HOOD TO SORT OF REDUCE INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY'S PRESENCE 
AT THE TRIAL. AND HE SUGGESTED THAT MAYBE I OUGHT TO TALK 
TO INDUSTRIAL ABOUT TENDERING, FORMALLY TENDERING, ONCE 
AGAIN, INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY'S DEFENSE IN THE MATTER FOR 
PURPOSES OF THE TRIAL TO MR. ANDERSON SO THAT WE COULD REDUCE) 
COUNSEL BY ONE AND, I THINK, REDUCE, ULTIMATELY, THE IMPACT 
THAT INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY'S SEPARATE PRESENCE MIGHT HAVE 
ON THE JURY DURING THE TRIAL. 
Q SO THE THOUGHT WAS AS MUCH TO REDUCE ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AS IT WAS TO REDUCE THE DEEP POCKET EFFECT OF HAVING 
AN INSURANCE COMPANY--
A YEAH, IT WAS MY IMPRESSION AT THE TIME THAT THE 
CONCERN WAS PRIMARILY WITH THE JURY EFFECT. I WAS ALWAYS 
INTERESTED IN KEEPING OUR INVOLVEMENT TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM 
CONSISTENT WITH OUR PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY'S 
POSITION. 
Q HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THE LEGAL POSTURE 
OF THE CASE IN MAY OF '91? THAT IS TO SAY, AT THAT POINT, 
DID INDUSTRIAL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN ITS POSITION 
FROM JAMES? 
A AT THAT TIME NO, THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFER-
ENCE. WE STILL HAD TECHNICALLY, I GUESS, AN OVERPAYMENT 
DEFENSE BUT WE HAD PRETTY MUCH CONFIRMED THAT WOULD NOT 
BE ASSERTED SO THAT PLACED US IN, ESSENTIALLY, THE SAME 
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SHOES AS JAMES CONSTRUCTORS EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT OF OUR, 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY'S, BOND CAP. 
Q I SEE. SO YOUR CASE STOOD ON JAMES' CASE AND 
YOU WON OR LOST WHETHER JAMES WON OR LOST, AT LEAST TO THE 
EXTENT OF THE BOND. 
A THAT'S RIGHT. 
Q AND SO DID YOU FEEL THEN THAT IT WOULD NOT 
JEOPARDIZE INDUSTRIAL'S POSITION TO ALLOW JAMES TO TAKE 
OVER THE DEFENSE? 
A BASED ULTIMATELY ON INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY'S 
ACCEPTANCE OF THE SUGGESTION AND THEIR RENEWED REVIEW OF 
HOOD'S FINANCIAL STATEMENT THAT IS CORRECT. 
Q OKAY. NOW, THIS TOOK PLACE IN MAY. I WANT TO 
SHOW YOU AN EXHIBIT-
MR. DANIELS: WAS 19 RECEIVED, YOUR HONOR? 
JUDGE YOUNG: NO. 
WE'D OFFER IT. 
19 IS OFFERED. ANY OBJECTION TO 19 
MR. ANDERSON: NO OBJECTION. 
JUDGE YOUNG: 19-P IS RECEIVED. 
(WHEREUPON, PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 
NO. 19 WAS OFFERED AND RECEIVED 
INTO EVIDENCE). 
MR. DANIELS: THANK YOU. 
CBY MR. DANIELS) I'M GOING TO SHOW YOU WHAT'S 
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1
 A YES, I GAVE PARTICULAR PARAMETERS TO INPUT TO 
2
 SOMEONE WHO IS COMPUTER LITERATE. I'M NOT COMPUTER LITERATE 
3
 JUDGE YOUNG: ANY OBJECTION TO THE OFFERED 
4
 EXHIBIT? 
5 MR. DANIELS: I DO OBJECT, YOUR HONOR. FOUNDATION^ 
6
 JUDGE YOUNG: AS TO CREATING IT OR— 
7
 MR. DANIELS: NO, NOT THAT. 
8 JUDGE YOUNG: I THINK YOUR OBJECTION GOES MORE 
9
 I TO THE MERITS AND WHAT THE EXHIBIT STANDS FOR THAN ITS 
ADMISSIBILITY, IF I UNDERSTAND IT. 
MR. DANIELS: IT GOES TO HIS CONCLUSIONS, IT 
12
 IS NOT THE RAW NUMBERS THAT HE'S TAKEN IN THERE BUT HIS 
13
 CONCLUSIONS. I DON'T, AT THIS POINT, UNDERSTAND WHAT HE, 
14
 HOW HE DETERMINED WHAT WAS REASONABLE AND WHAT WAS UNREASON-
15
 ABLE AND I OBJECT TO IT ON THAT BASIS. 
16
 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. WELL, THE EXHIBIT WILL 
17
 BE RECEIVED AS ILLUSTRATIVE OF HIS TESTIMONY AND IT WILL 
18
 BE SUBJECT TO YOUR CROSS-EXAMINATION IN THAT REGARD. 
19
 MR. DANIELS: THANK YOU. 
20 (WHEREUPON, DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 
NO. 21 WAS OFFERED AND RECEIVED 
21
 INTO EVIDENCE). 
22 
2 3
 Q (BY MR. ANDERSON) MR. MARIGER, WOULD YOU PROCEED 
2 4
 TO REVIEW AND EXPLAIN TO THE COURT AND COUNSEL WHAT THE 
25
 STUDY IS WHICH IS MARKED EXHIBIT 21-D? 
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1 A WHAT I DID IS I, AS I SAID, IDENTIFIED A PARTICU-
2 LAR PERIOD OF TIME. THE FIRST PERIOD OF TIME THAT I IDENT1-
3 FIED WAS FROM MAY 1 OF 1984 WHEN THE CONTRACTOR WAS TERMIN-
4 ATED ON THIS PROJECT, ACCORDING TO THE BILLING STATEMENTS 
5 THAT'S WHEN SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU LEARNED OF THAT, 
6 UNTIL AUGUST 8TH OF 1984 WHEN MR. BROWN PREPARED THE TENDER 
7 OF DEFENSE FROM INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY. I LOOKED AT THAT 
8 PERIOD OF TIME AND WHAT I SAW IS WHAT I'D EXPECT ANY SURETY 
9 TO DO TO AVOID A BAD FAITH CLAIM. AND SO I THINK THAT AGAIN 
10 THERE WAS SOME BILLINGS IN THERE THAT DIDN'T RELATE TO THAT 
11 PROJECT BUT BEING UNABLE TO SEGREGATE THOSE OUT FOR THAT 
12 PERIOD OF TIME THOSE WERE REASONABLE FEES IN THAT PERIOD 
13 OF TIME. 
14 THEN I IDENTIFIED ANOTHER PERIOD FROM AUGUST 
15 8 OF 1984, THAT IS THE DATE OF MR. BROWN'S ACCEPTANCE OF 
16 THE TENDER, THROUGH JUNE 24 OF 1987 WHEN MR. BROWN RE-
17 TENDERED THE DEFENSE TO INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY. DURING THAT 
18 PERIOD OF TIME IT APPEARED TO ME THAT SNOW, CHRISTENSEN 
19 & MARTINEAU WAS REVIEWING FINANCIAL RECORDS OF A PERIODIC 
20 BASIS, THEY WERE KEEPING THEIR CLIENT INFORMED OF WHAT THEY 
21 UNDERSTOOD WAS OCCURRING IN THE LITIGATION, THEY, FROM CORRES 
22 PONDENCE I'VE SEEN, THEY WERE BEING REQUESTED ON OCCASIONS 
23 TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO MR. BROWN. I THOUGHT THAT THE 
24 ACTIVITIES THAT I SAW DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME, AGAIN 
25 BARRING THE FACT THAT THERE WAS SOME PROJECTS THAT DON'T 
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APPEAR TO BE RELATED TO SALT LAKE CITY, THEY APPEARED TO 
BE REASONABLE, APPEARED THAT'S WHAT I WOULD EXPECT TO SEE 
IN A SURETY'S FILE. 
THEN I ALSO IDENTIFIED ANOTHER PERIOD FROM JUNE 
24 OF 1987 WHEN MR, BROWN RE-TENDERED UNTIL AUGUST 25 OF 
1987 WHEN MR. BROWN REQUESTED THAT INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY 
ALLOW HIM TO RE-ENTER AN APPEARANCE IN THEIR BEHALF AND 
DEFEND THE CASE. 
DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME THERE WAS INCREASED 
ACTIVITY BY INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY, WHICH WOULD BE WHAT ONE 
MIGHT EXPECT IF THEY RECEIVED A LETTER LIKE THEY DID IN 
JUNE OF ' 8 7 . I T ' S VERY UNUSUAL FOR A PRINCIPAL TO RE-TENDER 
BACK A CASE AND I DIDN'T SEE ANYTHING UNUSUAL IN THE 
ACTIVITIES DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME. 
THE NEXT PERIOD OF TIME WAS AUGUST 27 OF 1987 
THROUGH APRIL 27 OF 1988. AUGUST 25 OF '87 IS THE DATE 
WHEN MR. BROWN SAID HE WANTED TO, HIS FEE DISPUTE WITH HOOD 
WAS RESOLVED, HE WANTED TO ASSERT DEFENSES AND DEFEND INDUS-
TRIAL INDEMNITY THROUGH THE TIME WHEN THE STIPULATION WAS 
FINALLY SIGNED BY MR. NORTON ON BEHALF OF INDUSTRIAL INDEM-
NITY. DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME, AS I'VE SAID BEFORE, 
I DO NOT BELIEVE THE FEES WOULD BE WHAT ARE REASONABLE. I 
WOULDN'T EXPECT THE SURETY TO ENTER A DEFENSE IF THE PRINCI-
PAL IS SOLVENT AND THE PRINCIPAL IS WILLING TO UNDERTAKE 
THE DEFENSE OF THE SURETY. SO THAT PERIOD OF TIME, I SAID, 
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1 I ATTORNEY'S FEES IS BAD FAITH. THE SURETY IS ENTITLED TO 
2 GO OUT AND DO WHAT THEY HAVE TO DO TO DEFEND THEMSELF. 
3 AND THE ONLY WAY THAT THEY WON'T BE FULLY REIMBURSED IF 
4
 IT'S BAD FAITH, THAT IS, IT'S NOT A BLANK CHECK, WE CAN'T 
5 JUST GO OUT AND RUN UP ANY BILL WE WANT AND SAY DON'T WORRY 
6 ABOUT IT BECAUSE SOMEBODY HAS TO PAY. THAT HIDDLE CASE 
7 HAS SOMEWHAT ERODED SOME OVER THE CENTURY. THE SURETY NOT 
8 ONLY HAVE TO SHOW THEY DIDN'T HAVE BAD FAITH BUT ALSO THEY 
9 WERE REASONABLE AND NECESSARY. 
10 I JUDGE YOUNG: I DON'T THINK ANYBODY IN THIS CASE 
IS DISPUTING THE REASONABLE ASPECT O F — 11 
1 2
 I MR. DANIELS: THAT'S RIGHT. 
1 3
 | JUDGE YOUNG: SO IT REALLY COMES, AS MR. MARIGER 
1 4
 SAID, WHETHER IT'S NECESSARY AND, THUS, UNREASONABLE. SO 
1 5
 IF IT BEGINS OUT AS ALL BEING REASONABLE THEN THE PRONG 
1 6
 THAT I THINK THAT MR. ANDERSON IS CLAIMING THE RIGHT TO 
1 7
 PREVAIL ON IS THAT IT, IN FACT, WASN'T NECESSARY. 
1 8
 MR. DANIELS: ONLY IN THAT, REALLY ONLY TWO PARTS 
1 9
 ONE WAS THIS SITUATION BACK WHEN THEY TENDERED, THEY RE-
2 0
 TENDERED THE DEFENSE, MR. BROWN RE-TENDERED THE DEFENSE. 
21
 BUT THE POINT I WANT TO MAKE IS THAT IT'S NOT A QUESTION 
2 2
 OF LOOKING BACK WITH HINDSIGHT AND SAYING WHAT WOULD HAVE 
2 3
 BEEN THE BEST THING TO DO LOOKING BACK. THEY'RE NOT ENTITLE 
2 4
 TO COME HERE LIKE MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACKS AND SAY, WELL, 
2 5
 J YOU KNOW, THIS WASN'T REALLY NECESSARY. THEY HAVE TO PUT 
218 
00007.1 
DAVID SLAUGHTER WHO CHARGES $140.00 AN HOUR, 
AND HE SPENT, HE SAID, 10 TO 15, AND SO I TOOK 12. 
MR. NORTON SPENT SEVEN HOURS. HE CHARGES 160.00. 
AND I'M THE REAL BARGAIN IN THE SUIT HERE. I 
CHARGE 135.00 AND I SPENT 18 AND THREE-QUARTERS. AND THAT 
DOESN'T INCLUDE THE TIME THAT'S SPENT IN THE HEARING TODAY. 
OF COURSE, YOU'VE BEEN HERE AND KNOW HOW MUCH TIME THAT 
IS BASED UPON THOSE HOURLY RATES. WE'D ASK THAT BE ADDED 
TO THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT BE RENDERED. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL NOW, TO CLARIFY. IF I UNDER-
STAND YOUR EXHIBIT P-2 YOU'RE ASKING FOR $171,244.84. 
MR. DANIELS: THAT'S WITH INTEREST. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THAT INCLUDES THE INTEREST. 
MR. DANIELS: YEAH. 
JUDGE YOUNG: PLUS $5,220.00 TO BE ADDED ON TO 
THAT. NOW, MR. NORTON INDICATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THERE 
WAS POTENTIALLY $5,000.00 THAT COULD HAVE BEEN ASCRIBED 
TO THE OTHER MATTERS, IN HIS TESTIMONY, IF HE GAVE A LIBERAL 
VIEW OF THAT. 
MR. DANIELS: YEAH. 
JUDGE YOUNG: AND THEN $148.00 FOR THE AIR FARE. 
MR. DANIELS: THAT IS RIGHT. AND THEN SOME 
INTEREST ON THOSE SUMS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: AND SOME INTEREST ON THOSE SUMS 
SHOULD BE REVERSED BACK OUT, THEORETICALLY, IN THE 
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1 CALCULATION. 
2 MR. DANIELS: AT LEAST THE $148.00 SHOULD. I 
3 WOULD TAKE THE POSITION THAT THOSE OTHER FILES, I MEAN, 
4 UNDER THE BOND WE ARE ENTITLED TO EVERYTHING THAT COMES 
5 FROM JAMES CONSTRUCTORS. NOW, THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THE 
6 CROSS-CLAIM IS BROAD ENOUGH TO GET THAT IN THE SUIT THAT 
7 RELATES SOLELY TO SALT LAKE CITY. AND WE WOULD TAKE THE 
8 POSITION THAT IT DOES BUT, FRANKLY, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT 
9 FOUR OR $5,000.00, NOT A REALLY BIG CHUNK SO . . . 
10 JUDGE YOUNG: SO I JUST WANT TO BE SURE THAT 
11 I UNDERSTAND THE THEORY OF THE NUMBERS--
12 MR. DANIELS: $3,000.00 PROBABLY COMES OUT WITH 
13 INTEREST. 
14 JUDGE YOUNG: MR. ANDERSON, YOUR ARGUMENT? 
15 MR. ANDERSON: THANK YOU FOR YOUR PATIENCE, YOUR 
16 HONOR. I GUESS WE MISSED OUR ESTIMATE OF TIME BY PROBABLY 
17 A MULTIPLE OF TWO HERE. 
18 FIRST OF ALL WE HAVE GOT TO LOOK AT THE STIPU-
19 LATION. PARAGRAPH 8 SAYS "INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY SHALL BE 
20 ENTITLED TO FURTHER JUDGMENT AGAINST HOOD AND LAULHERE FOR 
21 INDUSTRIAL'S COSTS AND REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED 
22 IN THIS ACTION OR OTHERWISE IN CONNECTION WITH THE DESCRIBED, 
23 BONDS FURNISHED TO, FOR OR AT THE REQUEST OF HOOD, JAMES 
24 OR LAULHERE." 
25 THEN WE NEED TO LOOK AT WHAT WERE THE SERVICES 
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JUDGE YOUNG: BUT WHAT YOU DID YOU ONLY ADDED 
IT ON, YOU DIDN'T COMPOUND IT, SO I DIDN'T COMPOUND IT 
ANNUALLY. 
MR. DANIELS: THAT'S TRUE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ON ANY BASIS. SO I DON'T— 
MR. DANIELS: I DOUBT WE ARE ENTITLED TO COM-
POUNDING. 
JUDGE YOUNG: SO WHAT YOU'VE DONE IS YOU'VE TAKEN 
A FLAT 10 PERCENT-
MR. DANIELS: WELL, ON EACH PAYMENT FROM THE 
DATE THAT IT WAS RECEIVED BY OUR FIRM. 
JUDGE YOUNG: SO ON EACH PAYMENT YOU'VE ADDED 
10 PERCENT. 
MR. DANIELS: PER YEAR. RIGHT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, OKAY. 
MR. DANIELS: ROUGHLY 60 PERCENT OVER. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THAT NETS OUT TO BE ABOUT TWO PER-
CENT COMPOUNDED PROBABLY. SO ANYWAY, BUT BACK ON THE NUMBERjS, 
I'VE TAKEN--I EITHER TAKE 51,000.00 OR I TAKE 122,000.00 
IF I BUY THE ARGUMENT THAT THEY AREN'T ENTITLED TO ANY 
INTEREST AND I MINUS FROM THAT $5,000.00 PLUS OR MINUS FOR 
THE ERRORS IN IT, OR I TAKE $171,000.00. NOW, EVERY ONE 
OF THEM STRIKES ME AS BEING SOMEWHAT ARBITRARY. ANY ONE 
OF THE THREE. AND THAT'S WHY I'VE CANDIDLY, WHEN YOU'VE 
BEEN IN CHAMBERS AND I'VE SAID TO YOU YOU CAN SETTLE THIS 
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Exhibit F 
HOOD CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES 
FINANCIALS 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT & 
M01 0X57. 
Fiscal Year 
1982 
1983 
198 6 
1987 
1983 
1989 
1 19S0 
J 1991 J 
Net Worth 
19,196,000 
21,383,000 
22,304,000 
23,944,000 
22,097,000 
25,196,000 
27,867,000 
28,406,000 | 
Net Income Before 
| Taxes ($) |j 
4,916,000 || 
1
 4,351,000 I 
(146,000) | 
6,156,000 I 
(366,000) || 
5,175,000 1 
6,719,000 1 
1,006,000 1| 
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(801) 322-9151 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq. 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
700 Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2018 
Re: Principal: 
Surety: 
Indemnitors; 
Matter: 
James Constructors 
Industrial Indemnity 
Hood Corporation; B.M. Laulhere 
salt Lake City Corporation v. James 
Constructors, Hood Corporation, et al., 
C-84-2857 (Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Utah) 
Dear Robert: 
This letter follows our discussions following up on Hood 
Corporation's request that Industrial Indemnity tender defense in 
the referenced action to Hood. It also follows receipt of the 
updated financial statements requested to assist Industrial 
Indemnity's evaluation of Hood's request. 
As we have discussed, and considering the present status of 
this case (and particularly in light of the Court's recent 
rejection of Industrial Indemnity's "independent" defenses) it 
now appears that SLCC's case against Industrial Indemnity rises 
or falls (within bond limits) with its case against James, to 
which Hood appears also to be inextricably tied. Under those 
circumstances, we have no disagreement with Hood's assessment 
that common representation makes both tactical and economic sense 
at this point. Upon its review of the updated financials, 
Industrial Indemnity is also satisfied that Hood and B.M. 
Laulhere have the continuing ability to hold the surety harmless 
in the matter and to otherwise meet their indemnity obligations. 
00007 I t PLAINTIFFS 1 EXHIBIT I 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq. 
August 2, 1991 
Page 2 
Industrial Indemnity is therefore willing to honor the 
indemnitors1 request, and hereby tenders its defense in this 
action to Hood Corporation and B.M. Laulhere, and to their 
counsel, to be undertaken without cost or expense to industrial 
Indemnity. Industrial Indemnity continues to look to Hood and to 
Mr. Laulhere, as indemnitors, to hold and save it harmless from 
all losses, costs, liabilities and expenses, consistent with the 
governing indemnity agreement and with the Stipulation earlier 
entered into. 
Please provide periodic updates on the status of the action 
so that we can properly advise our client and keep it informed. 
Industrial Indemnity reserves the right to reassume its own 
defense at any time it believes it appropriate to do so to 
protect its interests. 
Please return this letter with the requested signatures 
confirming the indemnitors1 acceptance of tender as outlined. We 
have enclosed an additional copy for your records. We have also 
prepared and enclose a separate Notice of Substitution of 
Counsel, to be signed and filed with the Court. 
Thank you for your consideration and cooperation in this 
matter. We look forward to a proper resolution. 
Very truly yours, 
^SNOW, CHRISTREJISSN & MARTINEAU 
-avid w. Slaughter 
The undersigned indemnitors have read and understand the 
foregoing and accept tender of Industrial Indemnity's defense in 
the subject action, as outlined herein. 
Hood Corporatipn
 7 
V / ' ;
 ( / _ --//'A ~ »> • 
By > .S '. *' '?'•*. "~ ^
 B-M# Laulhere 
I t s _ _ _ _ _ _ 
DWS:en 
21\8505.131\tender. 1 tr 
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